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INTRODUCTION 
The worldwide impact of the subprime crisis has revealed fundamental 
weaknesses in the system of international financial regulation (IFR) that has 
emerged since the 1970s. At the same time, diagnosing and repairing these 
weaknesses has proven difficult because the system and its functions are poorly 
understood. In sharp contrast with other international regimes like trade or 
environmental law, IFR relies not on treaties and formal international organizations 
but on “soft law” standards designed by informal networks of national regulators—
so-called “transnational regulatory networks” (TRNs). The development of these 
standards is highly uneven; detailed rules like the Basel accords on bank capital 
adequacy long cohabited with negligible progress in areas like insurance, hedge 
funds, and credit rating agencies. Scholars, for their part, differ sharply in their 
assessments of IFR. The conventional wisdom is that the current, informal system 
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of IFR allows regulators to respond effectively and flexibly to new market and 
technological challenges.1 In light of the financial crisis, however, skepticism is 
growing.2 Some prominent legal and economic commentators have even called for 
a World Financial Authority—a formal, treaty-based organization to regulate 
international finance.3 
An elementary difficulty in this debate is the lack of a convincing account of the 
objectives pursued by IFR. In other areas, relatively uncontroversial theories 
explain why unilateral action by states is suboptimal and international cooperation 
can produce collective gains. For instance, the logic of the international trade 
system rests on the premise that individual states often have economic and political 
incentives to impose trade barriers, even though protectionism ultimately decreases 
the welfare of all.4 Likewise, because some costs of pollution are externalized 
across borders, individual states may have incentives to adopt excessively lenient 
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environmental rules.5 In both situations, states can improve collective outcomes by 
adopting common standards. These simple theories provide both a rationale for the 
existence of the trade and environment regimes and a starting point for analysis of 
their rules and features. By contrast, no such standard account of IFR has emerged. 
While there is a widely shared sense that national regulation alone cannot address 
the challenges of financial globalization, a more detailed account is needed to 
understand these challenges and assess the effectiveness of the current system. 
This Article takes the first step in remedying this difficulty. It identifies five 
distinct objectives that cannot be achieved by states acting unilaterally, and that 
IFR has historically pursued. The IFR system has been largely successful at two of 
them: facilitating cross-border supervision and enforcement assistance among 
regulators, and removing barriers to international finance by harmonizing some 
regulatory requirements. Most of the success stories often described in IFR 
scholarship, such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ 
(IOSCO) Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU), the Basel 
Concordat on bank supervision, and international accounting standards, relate to 
these objectives. There are, however, three other objectives in respect of which the 
IFR system has performed poorly. First, it has encountered numerous setbacks in 
its attempts to raise regulatory standards in states where there is substantial 
domestic political resistance, such as offshore financial centers (OFCs) and 
developing Asian states after the late 1990s crisis. Second, it has struggled to 
secure durable collective action to raise prudential standards, such as capital 
adequacy rules. The 1988 Basel Accord was a major exception, but as will be seen, 
it stood virtually alone and was substantially weakened over time. Finally, the IFR 
system has generally failed to create credible collective mechanisms to address 
situations where unilateral action is counterproductive. For instance, there is no 
effective mechanism for cross-border bank resolution; often, each state simply 
grabs the assets it can to satisfy its own creditors. 
This assessment relates directly to the debate on the institutional structure of 
IFR. If TRNs and “soft law” only achieve such limited success, why do they 
continue to dominate IFR? The conventional account draws on rational choice 
theories, under which states design international institutions by carefully balancing 
the costs and benefits and choosing the most efficient solution. In this view, TRNs 
and soft law dominate IFR because they provide some incentives for compliance 
while preserving the benefits of speed, flexibility, and expertise.6 This Article 
proposes an alternative explanation that casts doubt on the purported efficiency of 
current arrangements. The explanation is two-pronged. First, it draws on historical 
path dependence, the idea that past institutional choices shape current options in 
ways that can prevent the adoption of more efficient alternatives. The current IFR 
system has been profoundly shaped by history. As will be seen, under the postwar 
Bretton Woods monetary system, international capital mobility was expected to be 
strictly limited. Therefore, there was no need for a formal institution to regulate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. See, e.g., Scott Barrett, An Economic Theory of International Environmental Law, in 
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private international finance, alongside the ones established for monetary affairs 
and trade.7 When the fixed rate system collapsed in the 1970s, national regulators 
faced numerous new cross-border challenges. With no international framework to 
address them and no authority to create formal institutions or binding agreements, 
they instead created informal networks and non-binding standards. For better or 
worse, this approach remains the cornerstone of the current system.8 
Second, the explanation draws on political economy by identifying three 
categories of actors that play a central role in shaping IFR: national regulators, the 
financial industry, and great power governments.9 While these actors sometimes 
have incentives to pursue effective IFR, they also have competing interests that can 
drive a wedge between the potential gains from international cooperation and actual 
outcomes. Thus, national regulators value some international cooperation, but also 
want to preserve their extensive domestic authority and resist binding rules and 
international oversight. The financial industry is willing to support some regulatory 
harmonization to facilitate cross-border activity, but resists costly prudential 
regulations. For their part, the great powers typically prefer fragmented and 
informal international governance over strong collective institutions where they can 
less easily wield their influence. Indeed, with respect to each of the five objectives 
identified above, this article shows that IFR initiatives usually succeeded when they 
had strong support from at least one of these actors and passive acquiescence by the 
others. While there are exceptions, such as the imposition of higher prudential 
standards after crises, such initiatives succeed only in very specific circumstances 
and tend to peter out over time.10 As a result, most of IFR is simply the lowest 
common denominator of what these actors are willing to do (or tolerate). 
In contrast with conventional theories of IFR, this account grounded in historical 
path dependence and political economy explains several features of the current 
system: the substantial differences in outcomes across areas of IFR, including the 
virtual absence of effective standards in some of the most difficult areas; the overall 
preference for soft law and TRNs over formal law and institutions; and the high 
degree of inertia that leads to slow, incremental revision of existing standards and 
institutional arrangements rather than fundamental reforms—even in the wake of 
major crises. 
While the analysis above is based on the historical development of IFR before 
the recent financial crisis, it illuminates the trajectory of the reforms initiated since 
then. The most difficult challenges revealed by the crisis—tackling systemic risk 
and moral hazard—fall precisely in the areas where IFR has performed poorly in 
the past. In response, governments and regulators have launched a major effort to 
reorganize the architecture of IFR by giving a leading role to the G-20 and the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) in developing and implementing an array of 
substantive reforms in numerous areas of financial regulation.11 Nevertheless, a 
review of three salient items on the post-crisis agenda—Basel III, cross-border 
resolution of financial institutions, and monitoring and enforcement of standards—
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. See infra Part I.A. 
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 9. See infra Part II.C. 
 10. See infra Part III.B. 
 11. See infra Part IV.A. 
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reveals that, despite ambitious goals, achievements have so far been uneven and 
many precrisis patterns persist.12 The postcrisis era in IFR is characterized by 
tension between stronger demand for effective reforms and the historical and 
political constraints described above. While these constraints make radical changes 
unlikely, the coming years may see a gradual move away from soft law and TRNs 
towards more binding rules and international oversight, especially in areas where 
the current IFR system has shown its limitations. The Article concludes by 
providing some recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of IFR within 
current constraints.13 
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the historical origins 
of IFR, laying the ground for subsequent analysis of its politics and achievements. 
Part II reviews conventional accounts of IFR, then proposes an alternative account 
that draws on historical path dependence and political economy. It identifies three 
categories of actors—regulators, financial firms, and great powers—that most 
influence outcomes, and proposes hypotheses regarding their respective interests 
and how they interact. Part III deploys this political economy analysis to explain 
variations in outcomes across five salient areas of IFR, and the overall dominance 
of soft law and TRNs despite their limited effectiveness. Finally, Part IV assesses 
the impact of the financial crisis on IFR, some of the reforms led by the G-20, and 
potential improvements. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 
A. The Bretton Woods System 
To understand the origins of the current, decentralized system of IFR, one must 
go back to the post-World War II settlement that created the modern international 
economic order. As early as 1941, the Allies expressed in the Atlantic Charter their 
desire to “bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic 
field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic 
advancement and social security.”14 The new system would be a multilateral 
alternative to the chaotic economic competition of the 1930s—what U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Morgenthau called the “desperate tactics of the past—competitive 
currency depreciation, excessive tariff barriers, uneconomic barter deals, multiple 
currency practices and unnecessary exchange restrictions.”15 These practices, the 
postwar planners believed, had deepened the Great Depression and ultimately 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. See infra Part IV.B. 
 13. See infra Part IV.C. 
 14. Atlantic Charter, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14, 1941, 55 Stat. 1603, available at http://avalon.
law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp. 
 15. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 2866, PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE 1226 (1948) [hereinafter BRETTON 
WOODS PROCEEDINGS]; see also RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY: 
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 76 
(1956). 
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contributed to the war.16 In their place, they sought “to recreate a liberal world 
economy in which stable exchange rates and free trade were the norm.”17 
The cornerstone of the postwar economic order would be a new international 
monetary system to replace the gold standard that had disintegrated in the 1930s.18 
A stable monetary system would, in turn, provide the foundation for reviving 
international trade by abolishing discriminatory preferences and reducing tariffs 
and other barriers to trade. In both areas—monetary affairs and trade—the postwar 
planners envisioned a highly legalized regime based on formal treaty obligations 
and intergovernmental organizations. In crafting the treaties, they strived to balance 
multilateral obligations with domestic economic and social policy autonomy.19 The 
most ambitious manifestation of this vision was the IMF Articles of Agreement, 
which established an elaborate code of conduct for international monetary 
relations.20 
The Articles created a system of fixed exchange rates, under which all 
currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar, and the dollar itself pegged to gold at a 
rate of $35 per ounce. IMF member states agreed to several fundamental 
obligations. First, they would adopt and maintain a fixed “par value” for their 
currency, expressed in gold or dollars, and not change it unless necessary to correct 
a “fundamental disequilibrium.”21 In order to fulfill this obligation, they would 
intervene in the foreign exchange market by buying or selling their own currency 
near par value.22 Second, they would allow private persons to freely exchange their 
currency for current account transactions, such as international sales of goods and 
services.23 This obligation amounted to maintaining the convertibility of their 
currency, at least for current transactions, and was seen as essential to reviving 
international trade.24 Finally, under this system, a country that ran a current account 
deficit would eventually run out of foreign currency reserves needed to maintain its 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. See GARDNER, supra note 15; ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 1883–
1946, at 669 (2003). 
 17. SKIDELSKY, supra note 16, at 698. 
 18. See ERIC HELLEINER, STATES AND THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: FROM 
BRETTON WOODS TO THE 1990S 25–50 (1994). 
 19. See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 394 (1982). 
 20. For an overview, see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
605–17 (2d ed. 2008). 
 21. INT’L MONETARY FUND & INT’L BANK OF RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., U.S. TREASURY, 
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. IV(1), (5) (1944) [hereinafter ORIGINAL IMF ARTICLES]. The 
term was undefined, but was “understood, it seems, to mean a situation not correctable 
within the time for which resources of the Fund would be made available to members under 
drawings.” LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 623. 
 22. See ORIGINAL IMF ARTICLES, supra note 21, at art. IV(4)(b). 
 23. See id. art. VIII(2)(a); see also id. art. VIII(3) (prohibiting discriminatory 
arrangements or multiple currency practices). 
 24. However, members were entitled to maintain currency restrictions during an 
undefined “post-war transitional period.” Most industrialized countries had moved to 
“Article VIII status” by the early 1960s. See LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 607–08; Beth A. 
Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money, 25 
YALE J. INT’L L. 323, 338 (2000). 
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currency at par value. To address this problem, all members would contribute to a 
fund administered by the IMF and available for lending to deficit countries, on the 
condition that they take steps to restore the balance of payment equilibrium.25 
The crucial point is that while they prohibited restrictions on current 
transactions, the IMF Articles of Agreement did not prohibit—and indeed 
encouraged—capital controls.26 The two architects of the Bretton Woods monetary 
system, Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes, concluded from the 
interwar experience that unrestricted capital flows were destabilizing.27 They were 
eager to preserve the economic and social policy autonomy of states, which they 
thought would be compromised by uncontrolled movements of capital.28 They also 
believed that unimpeded capital flows would undermine the fixed exchange rate 
system and free trade.29 Since shifts in investor sentiment could change the size and 
direction of capital flows much more rapidly than trade, the IMF’s resources would 
be insufficient to sustain national reserves while policy adjustments took place.30 
White and Keynes’ solution was to draw a line between capital and current 
transactions, permitting restrictions on the former but not the latter.31 Indeed, 
Keynes wrote that “control of capital movements, both inward and outward, should 
be a permanent feature of the post-war system.”32 Some countries, such as the 
United States, refrained from imposing such controls, but most did impose them.33 
Thus, the Bretton Woods system “strongly encouraged closed national financial 
markets, with limited capital flows, and open markets for trade in goods.”34 To the 
extent that international capital flows were needed for reconstruction and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. ORIGINAL IMF ARTICLES, supra note 21, at arts. III, VI. Each member state was 
assigned a quota, based roughly on its importance in the world economy, which it had to 
contribute to the Fund (25% in gold and the rest in its own currency). While in theory all 
currencies could be used for lending, in practice only those currencies generally accepted in 
international transactions—such as the U.S. dollar—were useful. See LOWENFELD, supra 
note 20, at 610. 
 26. ORIGINAL IMF ARTICLES, supra note 21, at art. VI(3) (“Members may exercise such 
controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements.”). Generally, capital 
controls are restrictions on cross-border flows of capital, such as loans and transactions in 
financial assets like stocks and bonds. They can take many forms, including taxes and 
government or central bank approval requirements. For the argument that capital controls 
were in fact encouraged under Bretton Woods, see HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 25–50. 
 27. See SKIDELSKY, supra note 16, at 676, 698. 
 28. See HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 33–35; Ruggie, supra note 19, at 290. 
 29. See HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 35–36. 
 30. In any event, the United States, which contributed most of the IMF’s initial funding, 
was unwilling to permit it to fund capital flight. Thus, the Articles prohibited member states 
from drawing on the Fund to meet a “large or sustained outflow of capital.” ORIGINAL IMF 
ARTICLES, supra note 21, at art. VI(1)(a). 
 31. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND EVOLUTION IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 99–100 (1982). 
 32. HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 33 (quoting 3 J. KEITH HORSEFIELD, THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1945-1965, at 13 (1969)). 
 33. Id. at 51–77. 
 34. Douglas W. Arner & Ross P. Buckley, Redesigning the Architecture of the Global 
Financial System, 11 MELB. J. INT’L. L. 185, 188 (2010) (citation omitted). 
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development, the postwar planners contemplated that they would occur primarily 
through official channels, not private investment.35 Thus, the U.S. government 
directly financed the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan.36 For its 
part, the World Bank initially was to play a major role in postwar reconstruction, 
but instead became a source of official funding for development projects.37 In 
addition, many of the leading Treasury officials involved in postwar financial 
planning were New Dealers suspicious of private international banking and its role 
in the interwar years.38 Secretary Morgenthau famously rejoiced that Bretton 
Woods would “drive . . . the usurious money lenders from the temple of 
international finance.”39 Given the limited role contemplated for private 
international finance in the postwar order, it is unsurprising that its architects did 
not consider its regulation worthy of a legal framework comparable to those they 
designed for monetary affairs and trade. Indeed, the existing organization, the Bank 
for International Settlements, was a legacy of the failed interwar economic order; 
some accused it of collaborating with the Nazis.40 The Bretton Woods delegates 
called for its abolition “at the earliest possible date.”41 
Although the postwar planners succeeded in creating a new monetary system, 
the negotiations on trade soon foundered. The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, negotiated by twenty-three countries as a temporary code of conduct without 
any institutional framework, entered into force on a provisional basis in 1948.42 
While representatives of fifty-three countries agreed to the much more ambitious 
Charter of the International Trade Organization later that year, by that time the 
momentum for multilateralism had passed. The ITO Charter never entered into 
force, and the GATT remained the central legal instrument of the multilateral trade 
regime.43 Thus, while international monetary affairs were governed by an extensive 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. See Maurice Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, Globalization and Capital Markets, in 
GLOBALIZATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 121, 132 (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds., 2003). 
 36. See JEFFRY A. FRIEDEN, BANKING ON THE WORLD: THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 68–71 (1987); GARDNER, supra note 15, at 299–304. 
 37. See LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 750. 
 38. See FRIEDEN, supra note 36, at 60; GARDNER, supra note 15, at 76; HELLEINER, 
supra note 18, at 31–32. 
 39. BRETTON WOODS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 1227. The New Dealers also 
insisted that the World Bank and IMF be headquartered in Washington rather than New 
York to “keep them free from the taint of ‘international finance.’” SKIDELSKY, supra note 16, 
at 828. New York financial circles, as well as conservatives in the United States, strongly 
opposed the plan. See HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 39–44; SKIDELSKY, supra note 16, at 
704–05; Richard N. Gardner, The Bretton Woods-GATT System After Sixty-Five Years: A 
Balance Sheet of Success and Failure, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 31, 35–36 (2008); 
Ruggie, supra note 19, at 393. 
 40. See SKIDELSKY, supra note 16, at 766; ARMAND VAN DORMAEL, BRETTON WOODS: 
BIRTH OF A MONETARY SYSTEM 204 (1978). 
 41. See VAN DORMAEL, supra note 40, at 203–06. Keynes, interestingly, fought White 
on this point. See id. at 204–05; SKIDELSKY, supra note 16, at 766. Ultimately, the BIS 
survived the postwar settlement and became an important focal point for central bank 
coordination. See LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 754. 
 42. See LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 27. 
 43. See id. at 28. 
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legal framework overseen by the IMF, trade was initially the less legalized area of 
international economic law. This situation changed radically in the following 
decades. The monetary system collapsed, while the trade system became ever more 
legalized, culminating with the creation of the WTO. 
B. The Rise of International Finance 
From the beginning, the Bretton Woods monetary system faced significant 
difficulties. First, the distinction between capital and current transactions was 
difficult to implement and led to significant “leakage” that compromised the 
effectiveness of capital controls.44 Second, an extensive market developed for 
deposits and loans of U.S. dollars held outside the United States, so-called 
“Eurodollars.” The Eurodollar market increasingly circumvented attempts to 
control capital movements, as well as U.S. domestic regulation, such as reserve 
requirements.45 Nevertheless, U.K. and U.S. authorities supported its 
development—the former to restore London’s importance as an international 
financial center, the latter to allow U.S. bankers to retain their business despite U.S. 
measures aimed at discouraging capital outflows.46 Despite these developments, the 
fixed exchange rate system functioned more or less as planned until the late 
1960s.47 Ultimately, it was destroyed by a third problem, the persistent U.S. current 
account deficits that led to massive accumulation of U.S. dollars abroad. These 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. In this context, “leakage” refers to the occurrence of cross-border capital flows 
despite the existence of capital controls, often by disguising these flows as current 
transactions. For example, multinational companies could effectively transfer capital from 
one country to another by manipulating the prices at which they transferred goods or services 
between subsidiaries. The leakage problem was aggravated by the fact that, contrary to 
White’s original draft of the relevant provision, the IMF Articles of Agreement did not 
provide for true cooperative enforcement of capital controls by member states, but only for 
“passive” non-enforceability in each member state of agreements contrary to the capital 
controls of another. See HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 44–48. 
 45. See DAM, supra note 31, at 322; FRIEDEN, supra note 36, at 79–122. Ultimately, the 
Eurodollar market compromised the objectives pursued by the Bretton Woods system, since 
it created a new source of capital flows that were not covered by traditional capital controls. 
These flows increased pressures on exchange rates and currency reserves, reducing the 
ability of countries to insulate their social and economic policies. See E. WAYNE 
CLENDENNING, THE EURO-DOLLAR MARKET 162–68 (1970). 
 46. U.S. banks could accomplish this by conducting Eurodollar operations in their 
London branches. U.S. dollar deposits held abroad were not subject to reserve requirements 
and other U.S. regulations. The interest equalization tax and other U.S. quasi-capital controls 
of the 1960s also generally did not apply to lending by U.S. institutions in London. See 
BENJAMIN J. COHEN, IN WHOSE INTEREST?: INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY (1986); HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 88. 
 47. There are other qualifications. The par value system was not universally observed: 
France changed its peg without authorization in 1948, and Canada floated its currency in the 
1950s. See LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 624. Many countries maintained current account 
restrictions for extended periods, relying on Art. XIV. See Simmons, supra note 24, at 346–
47. Nevertheless, most observers believe that from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s, the 
system functioned roughly as envisioned. 
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dollar holdings eventually exceeded U.S. gold reserves, triggering a crisis of 
confidence. Foreign central banks requested redemption of their dollar holdings, 
and U.S. gold reserves plummeted. In 1971, President Nixon abolished the gold 
convertibility of U.S. dollars.48 By 1973, all the major industrialized countries 
abandoned the fixed rate system, and several attempts to reestablish it failed.49 IMF 
member states can now choose their exchange rate regime and are free to change at 
any time.50 Floating rates also alleviated the need for capital controls to protect 
foreign exchange reserves.51 Over the 1970s and 1980s, virtually all industrialized 
countries abolished them, and later encouraged others to follow suit.52 
The collapse of the fixed rate system was a watershed for financial 
globalization. From then on, a clear, long-term trend of increasing international 
capital flows took hold. The move to floating rates created an enormous foreign 
exchange market, from a negligible amount in the late 1950s53 to a daily turnover 
of about $4 trillion in 201054—only a small fraction of which is for trade.55 Greater 
foreign exchange and interest rate volatility drove the development of global 
derivatives markets. Foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives still dominate 
these markets, with $523 trillion out of the $601 trillion notional amount 
outstanding in 2010—up from $68 trillion in 1998, the first year for which Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) statistics are available.56 The Eurodollar market 
also grew exponentially in the 1970s, buoyed by large deposits of dollars from oil 
exporters (often lent on to Latin America).57 The international activities of banks 
increased rapidly: in 1960, less than ten U.S. banks had branches overseas, with 
assets of less than $4 billion; in 1977, more than 100 did, with assets of $230 
billion.58 The external assets of banks from the forty-one BIS-reporting countries 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. President Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: 
“The Challenge of Peace” (Aug. 15, 1971). 
 49. See LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 624–33. 
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 51. See Obstfeld & Taylor, supra note 35, at 125–26, 133. 
 52. See HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 9. 
 53. See id. at 1. 
 54. MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, TRIENNIAL CENTRAL 
BANK SURVEY, REPORT ON GLOBAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET ACTIVITY IN 2010, at 6 
(2010) [hereinafter BIS 2010 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REPORT], available at www.bis.org/
publ/rpfxf10t.pdf. 
 55. See Gardner, supra note 39, at 43–44; HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 1. 
 56. See MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES 
MARKET ACTIVITY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2010, at 8 (2011), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1105.pdf; BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE GLOBAL OTC 
DERIVATIVES MARKET CONTINUES TO GROW 3 (2000), available at http://www.bis.org/
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 57. See FRIEDEN, supra note 36, at 88. 
 58. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 102 (2000). 
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further grew from $687 billion in 1977 to $30.1 trillion in 2010.59 More recently, 
debt and equity markets have also become global. International debt securities 
outstanding went from $896 billion in March 1987 to $27.7 trillion in 2010;60 
international equity issues for BIS-reporting countries went from $1.7 billion in 
1983 to $708 billion in 2010.61 Overall, the size of financial markets relative to the 
world economy has increased steadily.62 In 2007, global financial assets amounted 
to 343% of the world’s GDP.63 
Scholars have proposed several explanations for the globalization of finance. 
Traditional accounts emphasize the importance of technological changes and 
market developments: greater demand arising from the growth in international trade 
and corporate activity; the need for diversification arising from greater foreign 
exchange volatility; the need to reinvest the accumulation of petrodollars in the 
1970s; the demise of domestically-focused postwar cartels; and financial 
innovation.64 More recent accounts emphasize the role of policy decisions by states 
to encourage the growth of the Eurodollar market, to refrain from imposing more 
effective capital controls, and to act collectively to prevent and manage currency 
crises.65 While the causes of financial globalization remain a matter of debate, it is 
clear that multiple factors were at work, rather than a conscious policy decision by 
states to reverse Bretton Woods and create globalized financial markets. As U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler put it, “‘the Free World has backed inadvertently 
into a developing international capital market rather than effected a rational and 
conscious entry.’”66 
What is the significance of this historical background? In short, the postwar 
settlement created a highly institutionalized and rule-based system to govern 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW A7 (June 2011), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa1106.pdf. The first year for which the BIS 
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 60. See id. at A113. 
 61. See id. at A128. 
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1601 (2005). This is not to say that international markets are fully globalized. Indeed, 
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 64. See HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 6–7; TONY PORTER, GLOBALIZATION AND FINANCE 
12–30 (2005). 
 65. See FRIEDEN, supra note 36, at 112–22; HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 8–12. Some of 
these accounts also emphasize the rise of neoliberal ideas. See, e.g., RAWI ABDELAL, 
CAPITAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE (2007); JEFFREY M. CHWIEROTH, 
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MOVEMENTS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 61 (1971)). 
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international economic relations. This system was the outcome of ambitious 
negotiations made possible by the unique circumstances of World War II and the 
immediate postwar years.67 Because it contemplated very limited international 
capital mobility, mostly through official channels, no provision was made for 
regulating private finance. National securities and banking regulators, such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), did not take any significant part in the negotiations or the 
resulting regime. As a result of the collapse of Bretton Woods and a series of other 
technological, market, and political developments, international financial markets 
subsequently developed to a degree unimaginable at that time. Without a formal 
international framework, national regulators faced the difficult task of addressing 
the new challenges posed by globalized markets with the limited tools at their 
disposal. The constraints under which they labored are the key to understanding 
today’s decentralized, network-based system of IFR. 
C. International Regulatory Cooperation 
The collapse of Bretton Woods and the dramatic increase in international capital 
flows immediately caused problems for economic policymakers. In the 1960s and 
early 1970s, the ministers of finance and central bank governors of the “Group of 
10” met on a regular basis to coordinate exchange rate management and consider 
adjustments to the Bretton Woods system.68 At the same time, banking and 
securities regulators faced their own set of challenges. The world of self-contained 
domestic financial systems to which they were accustomed was rapidly changing. 
While banks had been expanding internationally since the 1950s, the trend 
accelerated, making it ever more difficult for national authorities to regulate and 
supervise their worldwide activities.69 Banks also found a major new source of 
revenue—and risk—in the massive new foreign exchange markets.70 In 1974, the 
collapse of several banks—notably Bankhaus Herstatt in Germany and Franklin 
National Bank in the United States—disrupted interbank lending and drew 
attention to the cross-border impact of bank failures and the lack of regulatory 
coordination.71 The oil crisis was also straining financial markets and causing 
worries about the international banking system. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. The most notable of such circumstances include: the (temporary) unity of purpose 
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id. at 142–49. 
 69. See FRIEDEN, supra note 36, at 76–77, 112–16. 
 70. See ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCE AND THE STATE 37–39 (1994). 
 71. See id. at 39–42; DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING 
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In response, the governors of the G-10 central banks formed the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision.72 As was the case for macroeconomic 
coordination, the prevailing ethos of IFR was informality. The committee would be 
a forum for regulators “not . . . to make far-fetched attempts to harmonise the 
twelve countries’ individual systems of supervision, but . . . to learn from each 
other and to apply the knowledge so acquired to improving their own systems of 
supervision, so indirectly enhancing the likelihood of overall stability in the 
international banking system”73 It was the first major TRN in financial regulation. 
TRNs usually share several characteristics: their members are not states but 
specialized regulatory agencies; they are not created by treaty and have no 
international legal personality; they lack formal assemblies or voting procedures; 
the instruments they promulgate are not internationally binding; and, at least until 
recently, they do not systematically monitor or enforce compliance with those 
instruments.74 Over the following decades, TRNs became the backbone of IFR, 
with formal organizations like the IMF, World Bank, and BIS playing only a 
supporting role.75 
The evolution of IFR prior to the subprime crisis can be divided into three major 
phases. The first, between 1974 and the Asian financial crisis in 1997−98, saw the 
creation of the principal TRNs—the Basel Committee, IOSCO, and the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)76—and the development 
of the first generation of international standards. In response to the bank collapses 
of the 1970s, the Basel Committee adopted the Concordat, an informal agreement 
on the supervision of international banks that placed primary responsibility on a 
bank’s home country for supervising the solvency of a bank and its foreign 
branches.77 While the Concordat allocated supervisory responsibility among 
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1418 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:1405 
 
national regulators, it stopped short of allocating corresponding financial 
responsibility. 78 In other words, the Concordat designated which country should 
take the lead on various aspects of supervision, but expressly refrained from 
designating which country should act as lender of last resort or deposit insurer for a 
given bank or its foreign offices.79 It also did not allocate authority over resolution 
of failed banks—individual countries remained free to set up competing 
proceedings and prioritize local creditors. 
The Basel Committee’s most important achievement during that period was 
undoubtedly the 1988 Basel Accord on bank capital adequacy.80 The Latin 
American debt crisis of the 1980s had left international banks, especially in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, severely undercapitalized.81 While 
regulators in those countries wished to adopt more stringent capital adequacy 
requirements, they were hampered by concerns that they would undermine the 
international competitiveness of their banks.82 There was also concern that the 
growing off-balance-sheet activities of banks created risks that existing standards 
did not adequately reflect.83 Under pressure from the United States and the United 
Kingdom, the other G-10 authorities agreed to a detailed framework for 
determining mandatory capital levels for banks.84 Basel I defined regulatory capital, 
established rules for weighting assets and off-balance-sheet liabilities based on 
their risk, and prescribed a minimum capital ratio of 8%. Over the course of the 
1990s, the Accord was adopted by many countries outside the G-10, becoming a de 
facto worldwide standard.85 
IOSCO developed in a somewhat different way from the Basel Committee. Its 
membership was larger and its structure closer to that of a traditional international 
organization, with an assembly, an executive committee, and a secretary general.86 
Its formation was prompted not by an identifiable crisis, but rather by a sense that 
securities regulators increasingly faced common problems, particularly in respect to 
cross-border transactions. For instance, an early concern was that firms could avoid 
U.S. securities fraud or insider trading laws by operating from countries whose 
authorities were unable or unwilling to cooperate with the SEC. To address this 
problem, the SEC entered into memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with other 
securities regulators and led an IOSCO effort to promote greater uniformity among 
MOUs, encourage more regulators to sign them, and help them secure domestic 
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legal authority to provide assistance.87 IOSCO also initiated efforts to harmonize 
regulation in some areas, for instance by preparing a model form for nonfinancial 
disclosure in securities offerings. IOSCO failed, however, in its efforts to create 
capital standards for securities firms.88 The last major TRN, the IAIS, was formed 
only in 1994 and its activities have been much more limited; for instance, it did not 
agree on solvency standards for insurance firms until the 2000s.89 
During these years, some of the fastest-growing economies of Asia—Indonesia, 
Thailand, South Korea, and Malaysia—faced major banking and currency crises, 
and the first three resorted to IMF and World Bank assistance to face massive 
currency outflows.90 These crises, along with the early 1990s Mexican crisis, 
shared several features: macroeconomic imbalances, asset bubbles, lax financial 
sector regulation, and tenor and currency mismatches (i.e., banks borrowing short-
term in foreign currencies to make long-term local currency loans).91 After the 
crisis, a consensus developed among the international financial institutions (IFIs) 
and the G-7 that weak financial regulation in those countries had been a major 
cause of the crisis.92 In response, they placed a high priority on improving 
regulation in developing countries to reduce the risk of future crises. The head of 
the IMF declared that the “world community . . . look[ed] forward for the definition 
of international standards and codes of good practices, which would be 
progressively disseminated by the IMF through its surveillance.”93 
The G-7 took on a more active and detailed priority-setting role for IFR. It 
created a new body, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), to coordinate the 
activities of the various TRNs and develop a compendium of standards whose 
implementation would be encouraged by the IFIs.94 The FSF did not develop its 
own standards, but relied on the TRNs to provide substantive content.95 The Basel 
Committee issued its “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision;” IOSCO, 
its “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation;” and the IAIS, its 
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“Insurance Core Principles.”96 These principles established basic requirements 
across a range of issues, often referencing existing standards such as the Basel 
Accord. Many of the recommendations were structural, steering developing 
countries towards creating regulatory systems based on Western models. For 
example, all three sets of principles required that they set up independent regulatory 
agencies and give them adequate enforcement powers and resources.97 The G-20 
was also created at that time to give a voice to leading developing countries, 
although its influence was limited.98 Finally, the IMF encouraged reforms by 
linking them to its lending programs and conducting audits of national regulation 
under two programs, ROSC and FSAP.99 
The third phase runs from 2001 to the subprime crisis. During that period, the 
IFIs’ work on implementing financial standards continued, but regulators and 
TRNs turned their attention to various other problems.100 After September 11, 
2001, a major effort was made to step up the fight against money laundering and 
terrorist financing. Led by the United States, the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) coordinated a campaign to compel offshore financial centers (OFCs) to 
improve their cooperation with onshore jurisdictions under threat of “blacklisting” 
and sanctions, with reluctant assistance from the IMF.101 IOSCO strove to 
strengthen cross-border assistance by adopting the 2002 Multilateral Memorandum 
of Understanding (MMOU). All IOSCO members were expected to sign the 
MMOU, which required prior screening to ensure they had the necessary domestic 
authority to comply with assistance requests.102 IOSCO has also been engaged in a 
multitude of projects to develop recommendations on credit rating agencies, mutual 
funds, hedge funds, securities analysts, and others. More importantly, the IASB 
made great strides in developing a comprehensive set of international accounting 
standards. The European Union decided to adopt them in 2002, followed by several 
other countries.103 The SEC recently decided to permit foreign issuers to report 
under IFRS and is considering adopting them for U.S. issuers as well.104 
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The most emblematic development of the 2000s was the decade-long effort to 
develop the Basel II Accord.105 Over the 1990s, the original Accord came under 
increasing criticism, mainly on the grounds that its risk-weighting formulas were 
outdated relative to the internal risk measurement systems developed by the largest 
banks.106 In 1999, the Basel Committee released a major revision that uses 
parameters generated by banks to calculate the risk of each exposure. The 
development of Basel II was long and controversial, and the committee engaged in 
an elaborate notice-and-comment process.107 The debate did not stop with the 
adoption of the final international document in 2004; U.S. implementation proved 
intensely contentious, and Basel II is not yet fully implemented there.108 
Throughout the 2000s, the Basel Committee’s attention was dominated, if not 
monopolized, by Basel II—perhaps to the detriment of other important issues like 
liquidity management or cross-border resolution. The IAIS, for its part, finally 
published a common framework for assessing insurer solvency in 2007, albeit one 
much less prescriptive and detailed than the Basel Committee’s.109 Like Basel II, 
the IAIS framework provides insurers considerable flexibility to use their own risk 
management models.110 
This brief overview supports some general observations on the origins of IFR. 
First, unlike in many other areas of international cooperation, national regulators 
rather than governments played the leading role. Without a formal organization to 
coordinate their action, they stepped beyond their traditional domestic role to 
pursue common objectives, limiting themselves at each step to the problems 
immediately facing them.111 Second, the outcome was the creation of a system 
based, not on binding rules and institutions, but on informal networks and soft law 
arrangements. Even after the Asian crisis, the role of IFIs was limited to overseeing 
implementation of basic standards by developing countries, and they almost always 
relied on TRNs to develop their content.112 Third, the usual preference was to 
develop very general standards that outlined the essential desiderata of a sound 
domestic regulatory system, rather than detailed prescriptions. Looking through the 
FSF’s compendium of standards, the few detailed prescriptive ones like the Basel 
Accord stand out against numerous general, sometimes hortatory, statements. 
Finally, several pivotal areas of financial regulation with cross-border implications, 
like bank resolution, deposit insurance, the lender of last resort function, bank 
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liquidity, and capital adequacy for securities and insurance firms, remained 
essentially untouched.113 The next Part turns to the politics of IFR to explain these 
outcomes. 
II. THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 
In its early years, IFR did not attract much attention from lawyers or political 
scientists. Since the mid-1990s, however, an extensive literature has emerged. A 
salient question has been why, unlike other areas of international cooperation, IFR 
relies almost exclusively on TRNs and soft law. To answer this question, most 
scholars draw on rational choice theories of international law and institutions. After 
reviewing these arguments, this Part argues that contemporary IFR is better 
explained by a combination of historical path dependence and political economy. It 
then draws on these perspectives to explain the respective role and motivations of 
three dominant actors in IFR—specialized regulators, financial firms, and great 
power governments. Finally, based on this analysis, it articulates several 
hypotheses to explain outcomes in IFR based on the interests of these actors. These 
hypotheses will be deployed in Part III to explain variations in the success of IFR 
across different areas. 
A. Rational Choice Theories of IFR 
In recent years, rational choice theories of international law have become 
increasingly influential.114 In essence, these theories posit that states rationally 
design international agreements and institutions in order to achieve joint gains.115 
As a result, their features can be explained by the nature of the cooperation problem 
the relevant states face. For instance, states that wish to attain a collective goal like 
trade liberalization, but know that each will have incentives to defect, are more 
likely to establish institutions like the WTO with monitoring, dispute resolution, 
and enforcement powers.116 By contrast, in simple coordination problems where 
participants do not have incentives to cheat, such costly features are unnecessary 
and states will eschew them. The same reasoning has been applied to many other 
design choices such as more or less precise obligations, renegotiation or withdrawal 
clauses, membership criteria, and the scope of issues covered.117 In each case, states 
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rationally choose the approach that best balances costs and benefits and therefore 
maximizes joint gains. 
Rational choice theory has important implications for the choice between “hard 
law” and “soft law” in international regulation. On the one hand, legally binding 
agreements allow states to make more credible commitments to one another. Ex 
ante, ratification of formal treaties is more difficult and costly, and therefore 
unattractive to states that do not intend to comply. Ex post, violations are easier to 
identify, states that commit them suffer greater reputational costs, and monitoring 
and enforcement can be delegated to institutions with the authority to impose 
sanctions.118 As a result, formal legal obligations are most valuable when the 
potential for opportunism is high and the credibility of commitments is 
important.119 On the other hand, while soft law agreements provide weaker 
incentives for compliance, they have several advantages. They are easier and faster 
to conclude because they do not require cumbersome domestic ratification 
procedures. Since they are negotiated by specialized regulators or other experts 
rather than politicians, technical questions can be resolved based on shared expert 
knowledge. Since they are not binding, they provide flexibility to adjust the 
obligations as circumstances change.120 Finally, international regulation is often 
said to address technical issues where opportunism is not a threat.121 In sum, 
rational choice theory suggests that, where the costs of hard law exceed the 
benefits, states will rationally choose soft law. 
Several scholars have applied such an analysis to explain why IFR relies on 
TRNs and soft law standards. Ethan Kapstein, after analyzing the creation and 
evolution of the Basel Committee up to the early 1990s, concluded that banking 
regulators successfully used informal cooperation to maintain effective regulatory 
control over international banks without compromising national responsibility.122 
Roberta Karmel and Claire Kelly argue that soft law works well for securities 
regulation because it provides speed, flexibility, and experience in regulating ever-
changing markets.123 Chris Brummer acknowledges that IFR sometimes involves 
more difficult cooperation problems and the risk of opportunism. However, he 
argues that unlike other soft law, IFR has significant coercive power because 
pressures from markets and IFIs compel states to comply, and because regulators 
wish to protect their reputation vis-à-vis their peers.124 Such explanations dovetail 
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with earlier theories that emphasized the beneficial role of transnational networks 
of experts in devising common regulatory standards.125 
Despite its strengths, I argue that rational design theory provides an incomplete 
account of IFR. First, it does not explain the substantial variation in outcomes 
across issue areas. For instance, while there are elaborate international standards for 
bank capital adequacy, similar rules for securities firms and insurance failed. Even 
in banking, some areas like cross-border resolution have seen minimal progress. In 
general, progress has been highly uneven across IFR, and has sometimes been 
reversed outright. At a minimum, this state of affairs should cast doubt on the 
functionalist reasoning proposed by much rational choice scholarship, which 
effectively “attributes the creation of an international institution to the underlying 
global need that it putatively addresses.”126 Such reasoning often fails to provide a 
convincing explanation of the agents and processes that actually determine the 
emergence or failure of cooperation. It is possible that states optimally design IFR; 
but it may also be shaped by other factors like historical path dependence,127 
coercion by powerful states, the private interests of regulators, or the political 
influence of the industry.128 
Second, the assumption that IFR is optimally designed predisposes scholars to 
neglect issues of compliance and effectiveness. Some are impressed by the sheer 
multiplication of international bodies, reports, and standards. But IFR cannot be 
judged by the quantity of its outputs.129 International standards can avoid difficult 
areas on which regulators disagree; they can paper over differences with 
meaningless formulas that merely restate existing practices; they can preserve 
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extensive national discretion that is then abused. Even when meaningful standards 
are adopted, compliance is hard to monitor;130 later revisions can compromise the 
original objective;131 and seemingly well-established standards can retreat as 
domestic politics shift.132 Therefore, a satisfactory theory of IFR cannot avoid 
asking to what extent it actually requires states to depart from what they would 
otherwise do, and whether they comply when faced with competing pressures. 
Third, the widespread argument that market pressures play a pivotal role in 
enforcing IFR standards—thus compensating for the lack of formal monitoring or 
enforcement—raises both empirical and theoretical difficulties.133 In a study of East 
Asian financial reforms after the 1997 crisis, Andrew Walter finds that 
governments were caught between external market and IFI pressure to adopt 
international standards and intense resistance from powerful domestic 
constituencies: politically connected oligarchs, industrial conglomerates, and large 
banks. He finds that, since markets and IFIs are able to identify and reward formal 
but not substantive compliance, governments adopted a strategy of “mock 
compliance”—formally adopting the standards while ignoring them in practice.134 
These findings challenge the hypothesis that market pressures can deliver 
compliance with IFR. More fundamentally, the logic of the hypothesis is flawed 
with respect to prudential rules that force private firms to internalize social costs, 
and therefore make them less profitable.135 In such cases, there is reason to be 
concerned that markets will reward firms and countries that circumvent the rules, 
not punish them. Thus, a better account is needed of where market pressures can 
play a positive role, and where they may be ineffective or counterproductive. 
B. Historical Path Dependence and IFR 
In fact, there are at least two major reasons to doubt that soft law and TRNs 
maximize joint gains for states. The first is historical path dependence—the notion 
that the original design of institutions can constrain their future evolution and 
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prevent efficient adaptation to changed circumstances.136 As scholars working in 
this tradition point out, institutions are often not optimally designed in the first 
place.137 However, even if one assumes that they are, their original design 
constrains their capacity to evolve in response to changed circumstances. As Paul 
Pierson notes, “[a]ctors do not inherit a blank slate that they can remake at will 
when their preferences shift or unintended consequences become visible. Instead, 
actors find that the dead weight of previous institutional choices seriously limits 
their room to maneuver.”138 They face path dependence, which Orfeo Fioretos 
defines as “a process in which the structure that prevails after a specific moment in 
time (often a critical juncture) shapes the subsequent trajectory in ways that make 
alternative institutional designs substantially less likely to triumph, including those 
that would be more efficient.”139 
There are several ways in which past choices may constrain future options. 
Some scholars have suggested psychological explanations. Douglass North argues 
that actors operating in highly complex and opaque areas filter new information 
through their existing “mental maps,”140 so that mistaken intellectual outlooks 
remain uncorrected. Other scholars emphasize political explanations, in particular 
the “lock-in effect” that arises from existing commitments.141 Thus, Fioretos notes 
that “because interest groups frequently owe their position of power to the strategic 
position occupied at the founding moment of an institution . . . [they] often see 
greater benefits from reproducing extant arrangements than from embracing radical 
change.”142 Several other phenomena may also reinforce path dependence: 
institutions often create network externalities, generate increasing returns, and 
become interconnected with other institutions, reinforcing each other against 
change.143 In these circumstances, institutional change will be limited and 
incremental, adaptation that would produce collective gains will not occur, and 
institutions will outlive their rationale.144 Actors will respond to new problems with 
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“institutional layering,” creating subsidiary organizations with limited authority 
alongside existing arrangements.145 
The notion of historical path dependence provides a fruitful perspective on the 
development of IFR. The current system was not created in a vacuum; its formation 
has been deeply affected by history. The Bretton Woods negotiations were the 
critical juncture in the construction of modern international economic law. The 
participants, however, did not believe an institution was needed to regulate private 
international finance and did not design one.146 This omission made sense in its 
historical context: international finance was highly atrophied after the Great 
Depression and World War II, and the new monetary system contemplated strict 
and permanent limits on private capital flows.147 However, these expectations were 
soon defeated. The fixed rate system collapsed. Financial globalization took off and 
created many new cross-border regulatory challenges. 
In the absence of an international institution, national regulators took the 
initiative, but they faced several constraints. Their options were limited by their 
domestic statutory authority, which they could not easily change. They did not have 
a clear mandate to act internationally, much less bind their state to legal 
obligations. They did not have a forum in which to meet; often they did not even 
know each other.148 In that context, regulators proceeded incrementally by creating 
informal networks to exchange ideas, coordinate their actions, and agree on 
nonbinding standards. This was another critical juncture where the choices made 
shaped IFR for decades. Today, despite its limitations, it is difficult for politicians, 
regulators, and even scholars to conceive of a different system. More importantly, 
these foundational choices empowered specific actors—specialized regulators, 
financial firms, and great powers—that now occupy a central place in IFR. 
C. The Political Economy of IFR 
Beyond the historical dimension of IFR, the conventional account also neglects 
its political dimension. This section attempts to remedy this shortcoming by 
focusing on three important categories of political actors, the means they have to 
influence IFR, and the interests they try to advance. First, IFR is typically not made 
directly by states through their diplomatic representatives, but by specialized 
regulatory agencies that have some freedom to advance their own interests. This 
creates a principal-agent problem. Second, the financial industry has ample means 
and opportunities to influence IFR both at the formation and implementation 
stages, as well as a strong interest in doing so. This introduces an element of special 
interest politics. Finally, states are not homogenous in their interests and 
capabilities. The great economic powers disproportionately influence outcomes. 
Thus, interstate power relationships also matter to IFR. 
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1. The Role of National Regulators 
In most countries, the legislature delegates extensive authority to promulgate 
and enforce financial regulation to expert bureaucrats. While in the past this 
authority was often exercised by a department of the executive branch, the more 
recent trend has been to delegate regulatory powers to the central bank or to create 
specialized independent agencies such as securities, banking, and commodities 
commissions. As seen above, these specialized national regulators emerged as the 
primary actors in IFR when the modern system took shape in the 1970s. They 
initiated the formation of the principal TRNs and defined their mandate; they set 
the agenda for developing international standards; and they typically control their 
domestic implementation. Therefore, in order to understand modern IFR, one must 
begin with the incentives and constraints under which these specialized regulators 
operate. 
Administrative agencies are typically not subject to direct electoral discipline. 
Instead, they exercise powers delegated by the legislature and are subject to its 
oversight. In theory, the legislature has many tools to discipline regulators: it can 
override their policies by legislation, dismiss them from their jobs, reduce the 
agency’s budget, or even abolish it altogether—as recently happened to the U.S. 
Office of Thrift Supervision149 and the U.K. Financial Services Authority.150 For 
several reasons, however, the performance of regulators is difficult for the 
legislature to monitor consistently. The public benefits of regulation are often hard 
to measure; the agency is usually insulated from competitive pressures; and the 
compensation of regulators is, at best, indirectly related to results.151 In addition, 
the agency possesses specialized expertise and information that is difficult and 
costly for the legislature to acquire.152 As a result, regulators may be able to pursue 
self-serving objectives rather than those intended by the legislature—such as 
maximizing agency budget, minimizing effort, advancing personal policy 
preferences, or pursuing individual career objectives. 
The literature on administrative decision making characterizes the relationship 
between the legislature and agencies as a principal-agent problem. While it is 
impossible to ensure perfect compliance, the legislature has several means at its 
disposal to provide agencies with incentives to follow its preferred policies. It can 
adopt detailed legislation that delegates less discretion to regulators and exposes 
them to judicial review. It can reduce information asymmetry by establishing 
specialized committees to monitor the agencies. It can also adopt mandatory 
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administrative procedures, such as the notice and comment requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), to ensure that new agency proposals will be 
publicized and that constituents will have a time and venue to air their 
objections.153 The legislature also relies on interest groups to support its monitoring 
functions by raising the alarm if a proposed action adversely affects their 
interests.154 
This principal-agent problem is particularly acute in financial regulation. 
Financial transactions and institutions have become increasingly complex as a 
result of technological and market developments, which means that the rules are 
also complex and require frequent revision. Accordingly, the legislature often 
delegates extensive rule-making authority to financial regulators, accompanied by 
very general statutory objectives—the SEC’s mandate, for instance, is to “protect 
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital 
formation.”155 In turn, this means that courts can play only a relatively minor role in 
policing substantive policy decisions by regulators, as long as they follow 
applicable procedural requirements.156 While agencies face direct oversight by the 
legislature, the expertise gap between regulators and legislators and the difficulty of 
measuring the effectiveness of regulatory policy means that such oversight tends to 
be reactive, that is, to occur after a crisis has revealed regulatory failures. Interest 
groups may also raise the alarm, but since the principal interest group concerned 
with financial regulation is the industry itself, these interventions prioritize its own 
interests. 
David Singer’s work on international capital standards illustrates this 
phenomenon. In line with the literature described above, he finds that the primary 
concern of regulators is to avoid legislative intervention.157 The problem, however, 
is that setting capital standards involves a tradeoff: higher requirements reduce the 
frequency of bank failures and their cost to taxpayers, but they also reduce the 
profitability of banks and harm their international competitiveness. Thus, pressure 
on the legislature—and ultimately on regulators—may come from two opposite 
directions. If standards are too low, more failures will occur and the public will 
demand stronger regulation; if they are too high, the industry will complain about 
loss of competitiveness and demand lighter regulation.158 
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In normal circumstances, regulators can balance these pressures by setting 
domestic regulation within a “win-set” acceptable to both constituencies.159 The 
problem is that this win-set migrates over time and may even disappear. For 
instance, after a financial crisis, there is substantial pressure from the public for 
stronger regulation. By contrast, in favorable economic times, the financial industry 
presses the legislature to reduce the costs and burdens of regulation.160 Thus, Singer 
shows that in the late 1980s, both U.S. and U.K. banks faced heavy losses resulting 
from the Latin American debt crisis and growing competition by Japanese banks.161 
As a result, the interests of U.S. and U.K. regulators were closely aligned in 
seeking an agreement on capital standards that would satisfy domestic political 
demand for stronger regulation without further compromising their banks’ 
international competitive position. This exceptional situation resulted in the 
adoption of the 1988 Basel Accord. By contrast, efforts in the early 1990s to create 
international capital standards for securities firms failed in the absence of domestic 
political demand in major jurisdictions.162 Singer’s work reveals that the behavior 
of national regulators in IFR is driven by domestic political pressures; it also 
suggests that since demand for stricter regulation usually comes from the public 
after crises, it is likely to fade over time, allowing the industry to reassert its 
influence. 
In sum, financial regulators face constraints on their authority due to the 
possibility of legislative intervention. However, such intervention is relatively 
unusual and its direction is inconsistent—it oscillates between laxity and stringency 
in response to domestic factors such as financial crises, changes in the financial 
industry, and changes in the legislature. It is also imperfect, because the 
legislature’s capacity to monitor the massive and complex body of financial 
regulation is limited, agencies can sometimes circumvent procedural constraints on 
policy making, and punishing the agency by legislative action is often politically 
difficult or costly.163 In such an uncertain and changing environment, can any 
general prediction be made with respect to the behavior of financial regulators 
engaged in IFR? 
As will be seen, there is one constant: regulators place a very high priority on 
preserving their domestic autonomy, flexibility, and discretion. They are, in 
Singer’s words, “reluctant diplomats” whose “penchant for international standard-
setting emerges only when they are unable to fulfill their domestic mandates with 
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unilateral regulation.”164 While they welcome informal cooperative arrangements 
with their counterparts, they are usually unwilling to commit in advance to binding 
rules or specific courses of action. They are even more reluctant to submit to 
international oversight or to be perceived as judging the performance of their 
peers.165 They also resist standards whose domestic implementation would require 
legislation and prefer less ambitious ones that they can implement under their 
existing authority. No doubt, these preferences can be explained to some degree by 
legitimate public interests, such as the need for flexibility, speed, and expertise to 
keep up with financial markets. But they are also driven by the private interest of 
regulators in maximizing their policy discretion, placating powerful domestic 
constituencies, and navigating changing political demands from the legislature. As 
will be seen, this imposes significant constraints on their ability to make credible 
commitments internationally and hinders cooperation in some areas of IFR. 
2. The Role of the Financial Industry 
The second major political actor in IFR is the financial industry itself. To 
understand its role in IFR, the starting point is the literature on special interest 
politics. Many groups try to influence public policy to favor their interests; they can 
do so by lobbying policymakers or the public directly, or by supplying politicians 
with votes or money.166 In a classic work, Mancur Olson argued that such efforts 
suffer from collective action problems and free riding. These problems are easier to 
overcome if the relevant group is relatively small, the potential benefits of 
collective action for individual members are large, and the organization also 
provides noncollective services to its members.167 More generally, interest groups 
that benefit from superior technical expertise, organization, and financial resources 
are thought to enjoy an advantage in influencing policy making. 
In the era of financial globalization, the financial industry in developed 
economies has become increasingly concentrated.168 In 1970, the five largest U.S. 
banks controlled 17% of banking industry assets; in 2010, they controlled 52%.169 
In major European jurisdictions, the number of banks declined steadily while total 
assets increased;170 the market share of the five largest banks averaged 58.9% in 
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E.U. member states in 2006.171 In the United States, Europe, and Japan, regulatory 
reforms relaxed internal geographical barriers to bank expansion; abolished 
restrictions on integration of banking, insurance, and securities services; and 
facilitated access by foreign financial firms.172 Developed country banks expanded 
internationally, notably in Eastern Europe and Latin America.173 Overall, as a result 
of market, technological, and policy changes, the trend has been towards 
consolidation and the emergence of large, internationally active financial firms. 
These firms have many points of entry to influence policy making. The APA’s 
notice and comment process allows them to learn of proposed agency rules, 
comment on them, and raise the alarm in the legislature when needed. In recent 
years, TRNs such as the Basel Committee have voluntarily adopted similar 
procedures in an effort to increase transparency. The largest institutions are actively 
involved in this process, both directly and through law firms and industry 
organizations such as the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA), the Financial Services Roundtable, the Financial Services Forum, the 
Clearing House, the American Bankers Association, the Institute of International 
Finance, and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).174 On 
many financial regulation proposals, virtually all comments come from major 
industry participants, with only a handful from smaller firms, consumer groups, or 
the public.175 The industry also plays a leading role at the preproposal stage, where 
informal contacts with regulators allow crucial input in agenda setting.176 Finally, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 171. See Berger et al., supra note 168, at 15. 
 172. Id. at 9. 
 173. See John P. Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan & Paul Wachtel, Banking in Transition 
Countries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING, supra note 168, at 844; Fernando J. 
Cardim de Carvalho, Luiz Fernando de Paula & Jonathan Williams, Banking in Latin 
America, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING, supra note 168, at 868. 
 174. These organizations typically also provide noncollective services to their members, 
in line with Olson’s theory. See OLSON, supra note 167, at 145. For example, in addition to 
lobbying, ISDA produces standard documentation for many types of derivatives, legal 
opinions as to their international enforceability, and credit event determination and dispute 
resolution infrastructure for credit derivatives. 
 175. See Barr & Miller, supra note 107, at 24–26 (noting that most comments on Basel 
II, both internationally and domestically, were from the industry). In a recent study, 
Kimberly Krawiec finds that, while most rule-makings receive very few comments from the 
public, an active campaign by public interest groups produced thousands of public comments 
supporting strong implementation of the Volcker Rule. However, most of these comments 
were short and general in nature, while industry and trade group letters were usually lengthy, 
cogent, and specific. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer:” The 
Sausage-Making of Financial Reform, at 25–26 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2445. 
 176. Krawiec’s analysis of logs of informal meetings with regulators—created as part of 
a new transparency initiative—shows that financial institutions, industry groups, and law 
firms accounted for 93.1% of all meetings relating to the Volcker Rule, while public interest, 
labor, research, and advocacy groups accounted for only 6.9%. See Krawiec, supra note 175, 
at 32. 
2013] POLITICAL ECONOMY 1433 
 
as financial regulation becomes more complex, implementation often requires long-
term cooperation between regulators and the industry.177 
Beyond the rule-making process, large financial firms have many other contacts 
with regulators. They continually interact with regulators in their supervisory 
function, they routinely negotiate individual authorizations and exemptions, and 
their employees often migrate to regulators and vice versa. When they are 
unsuccessful in obtaining a favorable outcome from agencies, they sometimes turn 
to judicial review. Although courts have historically deferred to regulators, the 
industry has achieved some notable successes in recent years.178 Finally, the 
financial industry can turn directly to politicians. It “is far and away the largest 
source of campaign contributions to federal candidates and parties,”179 with total 
donations of $2.8 billion between 1990 and 2012.180 Financial industry 
contributions to Congress go disproportionately to members who sit on banking 
and finance committees.181 Econometric studies show that industry contributions 
were associated with higher likelihoods of legislators supporting repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act,182 financial rescues for Latin America and East Asia,183 pro-
lender bankruptcy reform,184 and adoption of the Temporary Asset Relief Program 
legislation.185 
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It is important to emphasize that this Article does not propose a theory of 
“regulatory capture” under which the industry systematically imposes its 
preferences.186 The claim is simply that there are theoretical and empirical reasons 
to believe that large financial firms exercise significant influence on policy making 
both at the domestic and international level, and therefore play an important role in 
shaping IFR. What, then, are their objectives? As will be seen, this often depends 
on the particular policy at issue, but three general hypotheses can be advanced. 
First, financial firms usually prefer policies that have lower compliance costs, 
especially when these costs are imposed to advance a public goal like financial 
stability but do not generate excludable private benefits. Second, they usually favor 
policies that enhance their access to foreign markets, as their business model 
requires extensive international reach.187 Third, they wish to benefit, as much as 
possible, from explicit or implicit government guarantees that give them a 
competitive edge over other firms that do not benefit from the perception of 
stability associated with “too big to fail” status.188 
3. The Role of the Great Powers 
Finally, though day-to-day IFR is primarily the province of specialized 
regulators and TRNs, their work cannot be insulated from interstate power 
relationships. One manifestation of this phenomenon is that the regulators of the 
largest financial markets clearly have disproportionate influence. In the early years, 
U.S. regulators played a virtually hegemonic role in IFR, sometimes by being the 
key players in TRNs, sometimes simply by unilaterally imposing their own 
standards. Until recently, the United States required foreign companies that wished 
to list their shares on a U.S. exchange to reconcile their financial statements to U.S. 
GAAP, a costly and time-consuming process. The Basel capital accords, often seen 
as the most successful IFR standard to date, were originally an Anglo-American 
initiative, and the impetus from Basel II came from the U.S. Federal Reserve.189 
Likewise, the SEC was the driving force behind the creation of IOSCO and the 
network of bilateral MOUs. More recently, the European Union has become an 
important player. Other countries like China, Brazil, and India are gradually joining 
their ranks. 
The exercise of this disproportionate influence by great power regulators in IFR 
cannot be completely dissociated from broader national interests as defined by their 
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governments. First, the government usually appoints the regulators, so they tend to 
be politically aligned with it and responsive to its ideology and objectives. Second, 
great power governments often determine the locus of international cooperation and 
use that influence to advance their interests. For instance, when the great powers 
became concerned about money laundering and terrorist financing, they steered that 
issue away from the IFIs and broad-based TRNs towards the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and FATF, narrower “clubs” 
over which they have better control.190 Third, great power governments sometimes 
intervene directly to influence the development of financial standards. For example, 
during the Basel II negotiations, German Chancellor Schröder announced he would 
not support the new Accord if it was not revised to treat loans to small and medium 
enterprises—the backbone of German industry—more favorably.191 
To date, there have been only a few studies on the role of interstate power 
relationships in IFR. Beth Simmons developed a model in which the dominant 
state—usually the United States—unilaterally adopts a new standard, and smaller 
“follower states” decide whether to emulate it.192 More recently, Daniel Drezner 
tried to address the decline of U.S. hegemony with a more general theory based on 
the interaction of “great powers” and smaller states.193 In his model, each state must 
balance the adjustment costs of shifting to a new standard against the benefits of 
convergence, which vary across states and economic sectors.194 In IFR, he argues 
that great powers usually desire convergence while others do not.195 His main 
example is the effort by the great powers to impose new international standards 
after the Asian crisis, which was resisted by least-developed countries (LDCs), 
because they would lose patronage opportunities afforded by political control over 
the financial system, and OFCs, because they would lose their ability to attract 
business through lax regulation. In response, the great powers entrust “clubs” they 
control—such as the OECD, the FSF, and the BIS—to design new standards, then 
enforce them against unwilling states through coercive measures like IMF 
conditionality, unilateral sanctions, and shaming campaigns.196 
While these are important contributions, there is currently no comprehensive 
theory of the role of interstate power relationships in IFR. Drezner’s model, for 
instance, treats IFR as largely unitary and therefore does not explain variation in 
outcomes across different areas of IFR. Nevertheless, the literature provides 
important insights on the role and objectives of the great powers. First, they are 
reluctant to support the creation of binding international standards and centralized 
institutions, because a more fragmented system allows them to wield their power 
more freely and achieve their objectives by shifting the issue to the most favorable 
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forum.197 Thus, if there is a widely shared interest in convergence in one area, they 
can delegate standard setting to an intergovernmental organization; but if other 
states oppose the standards, they can choose a forum where those states have less 
voice. On a substantive level, the great powers may also gain less than other states 
from creating strong international standards. In some instances, their regulatory 
models simply diffuse to other countries because they are perceived as successful 
or because of the prestige of their regulators.198 Finally, they can often impose their 
policies unilaterally when needed. 
Second, there are areas in which the great powers do want stronger IFR 
standards because they are motivated by broader political agendas than regulators 
or firms. For instance, the great powers are the principal contributors to assistance 
packages to countries that face financial crises. As a result, especially after the 
Asian financial crisis, they became deeply preoccupied with the quality of 
regulation in developing countries and were instrumental in driving the 
development of the post-Asia reform agenda and shifting monitoring responsibility 
to the IMF and the World Bank.199 Beyond preventing financial crises, other 
political considerations can inform their approach to IFR, including their fiscal 
interest in fighting tax evasion and tax competition, their security interest in 
fighting money laundering and terrorist financing, and their political interest in 
using access to international finance as a sanctions mechanism or bargaining chip 
against hostile groups or regimes. In such cases, great powers may intervene to 
compel the TRNs to take action, or shift authority to organizations that will be 
more responsive to their interests. 
D. Explaining Outcomes 
The previous section articulated a theoretical account of the political economy 
of IFR that emphasizes the role of three categories of actors: specialized regulators, 
firms, and great powers. This account provides a relatively parsimonious 
explanation of the relative success of major international regulatory initiatives 
across various issue areas, as will be shown in Part III. At a more general level, it 
also explains the widespread reliance on soft law and TRNs in contemporary IFR. 
At the micro level of individual areas of IFR, the hypothesis is that in order to 
succeed, an IFR initiative must have strong support from one or more of the three 
major actors, and at least passive acquiescence from the others. In other words, 
each effectively wields a veto over the creation of effective international standards. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 197. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 58, at 28–29; Eyal Benvenisti & George 
W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of 
International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 599 (2007). 
 198. On the phenomenon of international policy diffusion, see generally Beth A. 
Simmons, Frank Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett, Introduction: The Diffusion of Liberalization, 
in THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 1 (Beth A. Simmons, Frank 
Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett eds. 2008). 
 199. Indeed, the Basel Committee itself was very reluctant to articulate general standards 
of bank regulation and supervision that would be used to judge the performance of national 
regulators, and only did so under pressure from the IMF. See GOODHART, supra note 72, at 
438–40. 
2013] POLITICAL ECONOMY 1437 
 
This veto, of course, is not a formal legal prerogative like that of permanent 
members of the U.N. Security Council. It simply represents the actual capacity of 
each actor to defeat a new standard, either by preventing its adoption or by 
defeating its effective implementation. There is one exception to this logic: in the 
wake of financial crises, international prudential standards have sometimes been 
adopted against the resistance of the financial industry. For example, the Basel I 
accord was adopted after the Latin American debt crisis, and imposed substantial 
costs on banks. As will be seen, however, the adoption of such standards is highly 
exceptional; compliance is difficult to monitor and enforce; and as the crisis 
recedes and the industry reasserts its influence, the standards tend to be gradually 
diluted. 
At the macro level, the interests of specialized regulators, financial firms, and 
great power governments explain IFR’s overall preference for soft law and TRNs 
over formal treaties and institutions. As a result of the historical development of 
IFR, each of these actors occupies a powerful position in the current system. 
Therefore, they have incentives to resist the involvement of new institutions and 
actors that might challenge their position. Instead, they prefer to rely on strategies 
of “institutional layering,” adding new informal bodies with limited authority and 
autonomy to address new problems on an ad hoc basis. Thus, a heavy burden of 
inertia weighs against the creation of stronger cooperation mechanisms. In addition, 
the current system is relatively effective at achieving the objectives that these three 
actors privately value most and relatively ineffective at achieving other potentially 
desirable objectives that are of less private concern to these actors. These ideas are 
developed more fully in Part III. 
III. WHY REGULATE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE? 
This Part argues that, in order to understand IFR, a key distinction must be made 
among five different areas of international regulatory cooperation. In each of these 
areas, the rise of private international finance creates challenges for national 
regulation that states cannot fully address by acting unilaterally. As a result, there is 
a potential for states to achieve joint gains through cooperation. However, success 
is not purely a function of the existence of potential joint gains. Instead, the 
interests and capabilities of the principal political actors of IFR—regulators, large 
firms, and great powers—differ across the five areas and explain the substantial 
differences in outcomes. The interests of these actors also explain the dominance of 
soft law and TRNs in IFR despite their failure to support effective cooperation in 
several important areas. 
A. The Baseline: Regulatory Unilateralism 
What objectives do states pursue in cooperating to regulate international 
finance? The usual answer is that financial globalization has undermined the ability 
of individual states to regulate effectively. In this view, cooperation is the only way 
to manage increasing financial interdependence. By adopting common policies, 
states can preserve the effectiveness of national regulation in a globalized world. 
This view, however, is incomplete because it neglects the extent to which states 
prefer, if at all possible, to act unilaterally. Rather than systematically looking for 
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cooperative solutions, they first attempt to address new cross-border challenges by 
applying their own laws, even if the relevant activities also have connections to 
other states. The question, then, must be recast as follows: What objectives are 
states unable to achieve unilaterally, so that they turn to international cooperation? 
This starting point is conventional in international relations scholarship. Because 
cooperation imposes costs on states in terms of time, resources, and sovereignty, 
scholars do not typically assume that states have a propensity for cooperation for its 
own sake. Rather, they cooperate to achieve benefits they cannot attain alone. In the 
case of IFR, individual states are not defenseless against cross-border finance. They 
often can—and do—apply their laws unilaterally to activities that affect their 
markets. When this approach is viable, they prefer it. International cooperation 
involves extensive negotiations, delays, and compromises. States have to cede 
some of their authority and conform their laws to international standards, which 
may depart from their preferred approach. These costs can be avoided by regulating 
unilaterally. On a normative level, unilateral regulation appeals to the idea of 
subsidiarity, according to which collective institutions should perform only those 
tasks that cannot be performed effectively at the local level.200 
This preference for unilateralism is also supported by the history of IFR. Until 
the 1970s, international finance was marginal and regulation was a domestic 
concern.201 With the collapse of Bretton Woods, many new cross-border regulatory 
challenges emerged. While regulators slowly began to develop cooperation 
mechanisms, unilateralism was initially the more salient approach, especially in the 
United States. Thus, U.S. courts and the SEC exercise jurisdiction over securities 
fraud that has “effects” in the United States, even if the transaction occurred 
abroad.202 Until recent reforms, foreign firms with securities traded in the United 
States were required to reconcile their financial statements to U.S. GAAP, a costly 
and time-consuming process. Many other rules—for securities offerings, broker-
dealers, securities exchanges, and tender offers—apply as soon as the activity is, 
even in part, directed at the United States. Over time, the SEC has clarified the 
territorial scope of these provisions and provided some exemptions—but all of this 
was done unilaterally.203 Other examples of unilateralism abound in U.S. 
regulation, as well as many other countries.204 
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In sum, both theory and history suggest that, in each area of IFR, the starting 
point is unilateralism: each state prefers to address cross-border challenges simply 
by applying its own laws. As will be seen, however, unilateralism is not always an 
effective response. The first step, then, is to identify limitations on what states can 
achieve unilaterally. In areas where unilateral action has serious shortcomings, 
states may be able to achieve joint gains by cooperating. The second step goes 
beyond functionalist analysis by examining how politics—and particularly the 
interests of the salient actors identified above—affect outcomes in the relevant area. 
In other words, rather than assuming that the outcomes are driven by a rational 
calculation of costs and benefits by states, it examines how politics actually support 
or undermine beneficial cooperation in each area. 
B. Five Objectives of International Regulatory Cooperation 
1. Securing Cross-Border Coordination of Enforcement and Supervision 
A first limitation of unilateralism is that even if a state attempts to apply its laws 
to cross-border financial transactions, it may be difficult to enforce those laws in 
practice. When trying to bring a cross-border securities fraud case, regulators may 
find that essential evidence or witnesses are abroad, or that local judgments cannot 
be enforced in other countries. These practical difficulties can undermine the 
effectiveness of unilateral regulation. Likewise, as financial firms become global 
and their structure becomes more complex, supervising them internationally 
becomes more challenging. Without some coordination and allocation of 
responsibility among national authorities, some firms may avoid effective 
regulation altogether. This danger was dramatically illustrated by the collapse of 
the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, a global bank that circumvented 
effective consolidated supervision for years.205 
The first collective challenge, then, is to coordinate the actions of national 
regulators to close gaps in enforcement and supervision. This objective can often be 
achieved through relatively simple agreements on information sharing and mutual 
assistance. Much of the first generation of IFR standards—notably the Basel 
Concordat and the network of securities MOUs—relate to this type of cooperation. 
It has been successful overall, culminating with widespread adoption of the IOSCO 
MMOU and a workable regime for cross-border bank supervision under the revised 
Concordat. This outcome appears to support the conventional account of IFR. 
Regulators perceived a common problem posed by globalization and crafted a 
cooperative solution that produces joint gains. The story is not so simple, however, 
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because there is another crucial ingredient in this success: the interests of the 
principal political actors were also aligned in favor of cooperation. 
National regulators have many reasons to favor this kind of cooperation. It can 
be implemented relatively easily, it enhances their authority, and it does not 
compromise their discretion. They are not going beyond their mandate, but 
developing more effective ways of enforcing existing laws that might otherwise be 
undermined. They usually already have the legal authority to request and provide 
assistance; if not, cooperative agreements like the MMOU give them a reason to 
ask the legislature for more powers. This may be particularly true of developing 
country regulators, whose membership in TRNs reinforces their domestic prestige 
and authority over the local financial industry. Finally, regulators have little reason 
to fear unanticipated consequences, because these arrangements preserve ample 
flexibility to withhold cooperation in individual cases—for instance politically 
sensitive ones. The financial industry, for its part, has little to gain and much to lose 
by opposing this form of cooperation. While certain firms may lose from more 
effective cooperation, it is hard to imagine an industry association lobbying against 
cross-border antifraud or insider trading enforcement. There is also empirical 
evidence that the largest firms are rarely the targets of formal enforcement by 
regulators,206 giving them little reason to fear cooperative arrangements. 
Finally, the great powers have a strong interest in promoting this kind of 
cooperation because they are the heaviest users of cross-border assistance in 
enforcing their laws.207 Thus, the SEC was the driving force behind IOSCO’s early 
efforts to expand the network of MOUs.208 Likewise, revisions to the Basel 
Concordat were driven by the United States and Europe, concerned about 
inadequate home country supervision of banks operating in their markets.209 Most 
other countries, for their part, have little reason to resist such cooperation. There 
may have been some OFCs whose financial industry attracted customers by 
shielding them from onshore enforcement and supervision. In these exceptional 
cases, the relevant countries did not cooperate voluntarily and the great powers 
attempted to coerce them. For most countries, however, the costs are small. 
2. Liberalizing International Finance by Harmonizing Regulatory Requirements 
A second problem of unilateralism is that several states concurrently apply 
different rules to the same activities. These duplicative and often inconsistent 
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requirements impose costs and delays on cross-border finance, amounting to de 
facto barriers to trade. In some cases, duplication is merely burdensome. Thus, 
foreign companies issuing securities in the United States historically had to pay 
accountants and lawyers to reconcile their financial statements to U.S. GAAP and 
produce U.S. disclosure.210 In other cases, national rules are fundamentally 
inconsistent, creating virtually insurmountable barriers. Foreign stock exchanges 
cannot place trading screens in the United States because they cannot comply with 
both their home country laws and U.S. requirements.211 Likewise, U.S. mutual fund 
rules conflict with those of other countries, effectively precluding access by foreign 
funds to the U.S. market.212 The corporate governance and auditor oversight 
reforms of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act raised fears that some U.S.-listed foreign 
companies would be unable to comply without breaking the law in their home 
countries.213 In brief, unilateral regulation often imposes burdens on cross-border 
finance, and some of these burdens are unnecessary because the national rules have 
similar aims. 
As a result, an important collective objective that can be achieved through 
cooperation is to reduce these barriers. There are numerous explicit liberalization 
initiatives in finance, such as eliminating formal capital controls or making market 
access commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
These initiatives are necessary but not sufficient because they usually leave 
regulatory barriers untouched. For instance, many countries have financial services 
commitments under the GATS, but retain discretion to regulate in ways that 
effectively restrict access. When making GATS commitments, countries often 
grandfather their existing regulations; the United States did so for insurance.214 
Even without such specific carve-outs, the GATS allows states to “tak[e] measures 
for prudential reasons . . . or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial 
system.”215 That provision defines “prudential measures” very broadly and does not 
impose a necessity requirement, unlike most other GATS exceptions.216 Therefore, 
even in areas where countries have made GATS commitments, domestic regulation 
often remains a barrier to cross-border activity. In such areas, regulatory 
harmonization is necessary to effectively liberalize cross-border finance. 
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Some of the most important international standards fall in this category. In 1998, 
IOSCO adopted a standardized form for nonfinancial disclosure that reduces 
transaction costs and delays for international securities offerings.217 Likewise, for 
more than a decade, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have conducted a major effort to 
harmonize financial accounting standards.218 This project is driven in large part by 
the potential efficiency gains. For instance, the SEC’s acceptance of International 
Financial Reporting Standards-based financial statements for foreign issuers 
eliminated the need to reconcile their books to U.S. GAAP, which had long been a 
major transaction cost of accessing U.S. markets.219 Greater cross-country 
comparability of financial statements also leads to greater efficiency in global 
financial markets and benefits transnational companies.220 To be sure, these 
successes have taken substantial time and effort to come to fruition, and there are 
important areas, like mutual funds and insurance, where there is little 
harmonization.221 Nevertheless, liberalization is overall an area of relative success 
for the current system of IFR. Why? 
This is an area where large financial firms and transnational companies have 
much to gain, and unsurprisingly, they have played a greater role than in other 
areas. As these initiatives reduce regulatory barriers to cross-border finance, they 
gain easier and more efficient access to foreign markets and lower capital costs. To 
be sure, they might be reluctant to support harmonization efforts that produce 
stricter rules, as compliance costs could exceed the benefits of enhanced market 
access. However, the international standards produced by such harmonization 
initiatives are rarely stricter than existing national standards. For instance, the 
IOSCO disclosure form was closely based on the existing U.S. form.222 As a result, 
firms that already complied with U.S. rules could now access additional markets at 
little additional cost. Therefore, as a rule, large financial firms support international 
harmonization in areas like disclosure, customer protection, business conduct, and 
the like.223 Mutual recognition agreements, under which countries simply allow 
foreign firms that comply with their home country rules to access their markets are 
even better—from the perspective of the large financial firms.224 
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National regulators are often sympathetic to international harmonization efforts, 
as long as the resulting standards are consistent with the aims of preexisting 
national rules. From their perspective, more uniform rules and enhanced access 
expand the markets under their oversight, facilitate cross-border enforcement 
cooperation, and satisfy the most powerful industry constituencies. There may be 
resistance by smaller, domestically oriented firms that benefit from the existence of 
regulatory barriers to foreign entry. In some cases, consumers may also resist 
harmonization of customer protection rules and other areas that affect them. The 
influence of import-competing firms and consumers probably varies and might 
explain the relative lack of harmonization in areas that are consumer oriented and 
have many smaller firms, such as mutual funds and insurance.225 Despite such 
resistance, regulatory liberalization may be self-reinforcing, as it allows the largest 
firms to expand, gaining more political clout. 
Finally, the great powers have reasons to favor such harmonization efforts. 
Given the inherent attractiveness of their markets and the greater resources and 
prestige of their regulators, they are in a strong position to shape the international 
standards. By developing standards that are as close as possible to their existing 
laws, they can minimize their own adjustment costs and accrue a greater share of 
the benefits of liberalization. Thus, the SEC was instrumental in promoting and 
developing the IOSCO nonfinancial disclosure form, and the outcome was virtually 
identical to existing SEC rules. Likewise, although IFRS are poised to supplant 
U.S. GAAP, the FASB played a major role in developing the global standards, so 
they are often close to U.S. standards, particularly on controversial issues like 
mark-to-market accounting.226 Moreover, most of the large firms that benefit from 
harmonization are based in the great powers. 
As a result of this coincidence of interests, this is an area where the strengths of 
soft law and TRNs are most in evidence. Their monitoring and enforcement 
limitations are not major obstacles to success, since markets often create incentives 
for firms and governments to adopt and comply with international standards. In this 
area, private standard setting is also very important.227 Besides the role of IASB in 
accounting, market associations such as ISDA, SIFMA and the International 
Chamber of Commerce also develop standardized documentation, provide dispute 
resolution procedures, and even draft model statutes for adoption by national 
legislatures.228 Together, they have developed much of the international legal 
framework for financial derivatives, repurchase agreements, securities lending, and 
trade finance. 
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In a recent review of the literature on private standard setting, Tim Büthe 
helpfully synthesizes its major findings.229 First, he asks why private actors supply 
standards that amount to public goods and finds that “the supply of private 
regulation virtually never occurs unless it also brings private political-economic 
benefits to the suppliers.”230 Second, he asks why the targets of the private 
standards comply, and finds that except when governments enforce the standards, 
compliance must rely on private economic and sociopolitical incentives.231 These 
incentives are more likely to succeed where the standard addresses a coordination 
problem;232 but when the standard attempts to make the targets provide a public 
good or avoid negative externalities, compliance problems arise.233 Büthe 
concludes that “private monitoring and enforcement can fully compensate for this 
weakness of private regulation only under ideal conditions, including sustained 
vigilant attention by altruistically motivated volunteers and the absence of 
collective action problems, which rarely if ever hold.”234 
In light of these considerations, the success of private standards in areas where 
the objective of IFR is harmonization is unsurprising. The “public good” nature of 
the standards does not inhibit private actors from providing them because their cost 
is negligible relative to the size of global financial markets and the potential private 
gains. IASB’s 2009 budget was a mere $30 million—80% of which came from 
fundraising, mostly from large companies and accounting firms.235 Firms that 
contribute to IASB and ISDA very likely derive more private benefits from 
increased efficiency and growth of cross-border markets than they spend.236 They 
also benefit from being involved in the standard-setting process.237 Enforcing these 
standards is not a problem, because there are market incentives to comply and 
because governments often incorporate the standards into national regulation. 
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3. Compelling States to Improve Their Financial Regulation 
A third problem of unilateralism is that without international standards certain 
countries may maintain an inadequate level of regulation. In such cases, the goal of 
cooperation will be to ensure that all countries observe minimum standards that 
may require enhancing their existing laws and enforcement if needed. This 
statement raises two fundamental questions: why would some countries have 
inadequate regulation, and why would others care? Many countries have weak 
regulation because their financial markets are undeveloped. In some cases, they 
may now be reaching a stage where overhauling them is important to sustain their 
economic development. But these countries have incentives to improve regulation. 
They need no compulsion. They may use international standards as a model, but 
they might also use the laws of leading countries, or hire experts to develop new 
laws.238 Other countries also have limited incentives to assist—let alone compel—
them to improve their laws. After all, financial regulation has historically been a 
domestic concern, which suggests that countries had little reason to care about each 
other’s laws. To explain why some states might maintain inadequate regulation and 
others might want them to improve it, one must posit externalities. 
The hypothesis, then, is that some countries have incentives to maintain 
inefficiently low standards because the costs are borne by others. The latter, in turn, 
want the former to internalize those costs by improving their regulation. While one 
could imagine numerous potential externalities, two concerns have historically 
been important. The first is that ineffective regulation in developing countries and 
LDCs increases the likelihood of financial crises, imposing costs on others in the 
form of financial assistance and potential contagion. These countries, the theory 
goes, will not willingly improve their standards because some of the costs are 
externalized and because powerful domestic constituencies benefit from the status 
quo. Thus, Drezner argues that elites in LDCs benefit from poorly regulated 
financial systems that they can manipulate for patronage, and Walter argues that 
businessmen tied to political leaders oppose reforms that would reduce their control 
over the financial sector.239 This concern motivated the post-Asia reform agenda. 
The second concern is that some countries may use lax regulation to attract 
business to their financial industry, while externalizing the costs. For instance, an 
OFC could turn a blind eye to money laundering and tax evasion by drug cartels 
from a neighboring country, thus benefitting from their business while the costs of 
criminality are borne by its neighbor. This concern—justified or not—motivated 
the campaign against OFCs. 
The experience of those two campaigns indicates that enhancing regulation in 
countries where influential political actors resist reform is exceedingly difficult. 
Once again, the political factors are crucial; but this time, they point in different 
directions. The great powers are clearly the driving force behind these efforts, but 
their interests are conflicted. On the one hand, their globalized economies are 
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vulnerable to economic shocks worldwide, and they are major contributors to the 
IMF and World Bank, so they wish to reduce the risk of financial crises and 
contagion. On the other hand, they prefer to keep standard setting in specialized, 
informal bodies such as TRNs in which they have more influence, rather than in 
formal IOs with more formal processes and voting rules. The problem is that TRNs 
lack the authority and capacity to monitor or enforce the standards. The solution 
was, in one case, to delegate standard setting to TRNs and pressure the IFIs to 
enforce them; in the other, the solution was to use a club organization, the FATF, to 
apply pressure on OFCs through blacklisting and sanctions.240 
Can such external pressures overcome political resistance in the targeted 
countries? Walter’s study indicates, at least in East Asia, the answer was largely 
negative.241 These countries, with the exception of Malaysia, formally adopted 
extensive regulatory reforms as a condition of financial assistance.242 Walter, 
however, distinguishes such formal compliance from substantive compliance. The 
latter can fail at three different stages: the government can adopt a policy of 
regulatory forbearance, the bureaucracy can obstruct implementation through weak 
enforcement, and firms can disobey the rules in ways the government is unable to 
sanction effectively.243 The key to Walter’s argument is that external actors, such as 
the IFIs and market participants, are often neither willing nor able to secure 
substantive compliance.244 The IMF, for instance, was a reluctant partner in the 
Asian reform effort: its mandate to oversee domestic regulation was contested; it 
had to answer to all its members, not just the great powers; and it had strong 
incentives not to declare a borrower in breach.245 Even if they had the right 
incentives, IFIs are poorly situated to verify substantive compliance. Measuring the 
quality of compliance is difficult as the information is not transparent, the relevant 
parties have incentives to conceal it, and the IFIs have limited capacity to uncover 
information independently. As a result, the IMF was severely criticized for its lack 
of expertise, its “check-the-box” approach to implementation, and its ignorance of 
domestic conditions.246 
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The outcome was “mock compliance”—East Asian countries formally adopted 
the standards while ignoring them in practice, particularly when powerful domestic 
actors were concerned.247 Walter provides multiple examples of this “hidden 
compliance gap”: newly “independent” banking regulators were in fact tightly 
controlled by politicians, accounting manipulation and regulatory forbearance 
allowed banks to circumvent new capital adequacy standards, and regulators 
ignored violations of loan concentration and insider lending rules.248 In corporate 
governance, the situation was even worse, as Indonesian political cronies and 
Korean chaebols fiercely resisted loosening their grip on companies.249 The IFIs 
did little more than gently flag the lapses they identified, often in confidential 
reports.250 The markets also were not privy to information that would have allowed 
them to assess substantive compliance. In any event, they had little incentive to do 
so, since they expected that governments would effectively guarantee loans to 
important or politically connected banks. Likewise, the diffusion of Western pro-
reform ideas proved a double-edged sword as resisters, who often controlled the 
media, denounced the standards as neocolonial impositions.251 In sum, efforts to 
use IFR standards to compel unwilling states to improve their regulation raise great 
difficulties and, in the most salient cases, appear to have been relatively 
unsuccessful.252 
4. Securing Collective Action to Raise Prudential Standards 
A fourth limitation of unilateralism is that a country may wish to raise its 
prudential standards for financial firms—for instance, in response to a banking 
crisis—but be unable to do so unilaterally because it would place its industry at a 
competitive disadvantage. This situation is unlike the one described above, where 
some states would gain and others lose from the adoption of higher regulatory 
standards. Here, even if every state believes higher standards are desirable, it 
cannot act unilaterally without sacrificing its own competitiveness. Moreover, this 
problem persists over time. Even if several countries did agree to raise their 
standards, individual members of this pact would eventually face incentives to 
relax their standards in order to gain a competitive advantage. In other words, 
international efforts to raise prudential standards involve a prisoner’s dilemma. The 
challenge is to secure widespread adherence and compliance by participants who 
face constant temptation to defect and free ride on the efforts of others. 
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The primary obstacle to such an effort is domestic politics. Banks and other 
financial firms resist the imposition of stronger prudential regulation. The reason is 
simple: they have incentives to incur more leverage and take more risk than is 
socially optimal, and regulation prevents them from doing so. For instance, thinner 
capitalization makes a bank more profitable, but it also makes it more vulnerable to 
failure. In a world where bank owners and managers internalized the full costs of 
failure, they would have incentives to balance these considerations when deciding 
how much capital to maintain. However, many of these costs are externalized. 
Shareholders cannot lose more than their investment. Additional losses are borne 
by government (through emergency loans, deposit insurance, and outright bailouts) 
and other firms (through contagion and higher deposit insurance rates). In other 
words, the economic rationale for mandatory capital requirements is that they force 
banks to internalize the social costs of risk-taking. From the perspective of the 
individual bank and its shareholders, however, such requirements constitute a 
private cost without a corresponding private benefit. Therefore, they have strong 
incentives to resist or avoid them.253 
In light of this rationale, the argument that market forces promote adherence and 
compliance with capital requirements requires reexamination. As seen above, this 
argument is very widespread in the political science literature on IFR.254 
Nevertheless, its logic is questionable. Since high leverage makes financial firms 
more profitable, shareholders will want more of it than is socially optimal. 
Creditors and depositors would normally have incentives to limit leverage, but this 
discipline is blunted by the existence of deposit insurance and, for many banks and 
large firms, a government safety net that protects even uninsured creditors. To put 
the point starkly: if the market already imposed adequate leverage constraints on 
financial firms, there would be no need for capital regulation in the first place; by 
the same token, if one accepts the logic for such regulation, one cannot expect the 
market to enforce it. The hypothesis that the market will enforce capital standards is 
inconsistent with the economic rationale for their existence. The same point applies 
generally to all prudential rules that compel financial firms to minimize risk-taking 
and internalize social costs, like lending concentration limits, limits on affiliate 
transactions, or prohibitions of risky activities like proprietary trading.255 
The empirical evidence, limited as it is, is also inconsistent with the view that 
markets effectively enforce prudential rules. Before the subprime crisis, U.S. 
commercial banks were subject to comprehensive capital rules, including an overall 
leverage limit, while the largest investment banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers had to comply with a looser SEC regime based on Basel II, without a 
leverage limit.256 As a result, these investment banks were substantially more 
leveraged, more profitable—and more fragile. They all failed, merged, or were 
rescued by government during the crisis. The credit rating agencies, for their part, 
do not follow Basel but rather follow their own assessments of “appropriate” 
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capital levels for banks.257 In some cases, CRA ratings reflect the likelihood that a 
bank will be bailed out—thus giving it a better rating than its capital position would 
otherwise justify.258 To the extent that CRAs and investors take into account breach 
by a firm of capital rules, it is out of concern that it will be subject to enforcement 
action; but of course, this form of market discipline is entirely derivative of 
government enforcement.259 Even if market participants had adequate incentives to 
monitor leverage, it is doubtful they could detect outright manipulation like 
Lehman’s “Repo 105.”260 
An alternative form of the argument may be that markets push countries—rather 
than individual firms—to adopt international standards. Indeed, authors often point 
to the widespread adoption of Basel I outside the G-10 as evidence of beneficial 
market pressure.261 This argument, however, fails to distinguish between formal 
and substantive compliance. As Walter’s study makes clear, market participants 
cannot assess the latter since they are not privy to the relevant information, such as 
the quality of domestic supervision and loan classifications.262 Indeed, they may not 
even care about substantive compliance, for several reasons: systemically important 
or politically well-connected firms often benefit from an implicit government 
guarantee; formal compliance may be sufficient because “national authorities 
almost always effectively guarantee the liabilities of formally compliant banks;”263 
and their compliance concerns may be swamped by market trends such as the 
“global search for yield.”264 In any event, market pressures to comply with 
international standards undoubtedly have less influence on advanced economies, 
whose attractiveness does not turn on such seals of approval.265 In sum, market 
pressures likely play only a limited role in securing adhesion and compliance with 
international prudential standards. For the same reasons, private standard setting is 
negligible in this area. 
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Therefore, the primary force behind such prudential standards must be public, 
not private. Until the financial crisis, great power governments had little 
involvement with such rules, largely delegating the task to specialized regulators 
acting in TRNs such as the Basel Committee. The regulators, however, have 
complex incentives. After a crisis, they often are under considerable pressure from 
politicians and the public to adopt more stringent prudential rules. However, they 
must also consider the impact on their financial industry. As seen above, imposing 
stricter prudential standards unilaterally would undermine its competitiveness and 
produce a political backlash. The solution, when possible, is to cooperate with their 
counterparts abroad to adopt common standards. Thus, Singer argues that, in the 
late 1980s, the United States and United Kingdom faced simultaneous shocks to 
their banking industries as a result of losses caused by the Latin American debt 
crisis, thus creating legislative demand for higher standards. Unable to raise their 
standards unilaterally without undermining the competitiveness of their banks, they 
successfully pushed for the 1988 Basel Accord.266 
As it turns out, however, Basel is highly exceptional. By contrast, IOSCO failed 
to create international capital standards for securities firms in the early 1990s, 
because only the United Kingdom was facing a crisis and supported the effort while 
the United States and Japan were indifferent or hostile.267 For its part, IAIS did not 
even attempt to develop international capital rules for insurers until the 2000s.268 
Together, Singer’s case studies suggest that uniform international prudential 
standards only succeed when several major jurisdictions face similar crises at the 
same time and are willing and able to compel others to join. Indeed, Basel remains 
the only major international prudential standard with quantitative objectives and a 
precise implementation timeline. 
In sum, regulators rarely have both the incentives and the capacity to act 
collectively to strengthen prudential standards. This situation has several 
implications. First, the system is highly selective in choosing areas to address. In 
the absence of nearly simultaneous crises in major jurisdictions, coordinated 
adoption of stricter standards is unlikely to occur. Second, this is an area where 
quantity should not be equated with significance. Since agreement is difficult to 
reach, numerous “codes of conduct” and “best practices”—particularly those 
adopted by IOSCO—tend to be phrased at a high level of generality, lay out 
multiple options reflecting existing national practices, and lack implementation 
timelines.269 Third, as crises recede and prosperity returns, the domestic political 
balance shifts back towards competitiveness. In other words, crises cause the 
regulators’ long-term interest in financial stability and short-term interest in 
satisfying political pressures to converge, but soon they start diverging again.270 
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International prudential standards, which are nonbinding and lack effective 
enforcement, become vulnerable as regulators begin to cede to domestic pressures. 
This, in turn, creates pressure on other regulators to relax the standards as well. 
This relaxation can take several forms. The first is noncompliance: national 
regulators have many ways to allow their firms to avoid complying with the letter 
or spirit of the international standard. In some cases, noncompliance is overt, as 
illustrated by the fate of the Basel Accord in the 1990s and 2000s. As the banking 
crises in the United States and United Kingdom subsided, Japan faced its own 
prolonged downturn. By the mid-1990s, peer regulators knew that Japanese 
regulators allowed their banks to massively overestimate their capital, which was in 
fact well below Basel requirements.271 They likely were willing to tolerate this 
situation to allow Japanese banks to “grow out” of the crisis, and because they were 
no longer an important competitive threat. During that period, regulators also 
repeatedly ceded to industry pressure to allow dubious instruments to be counted as 
regulatory capital.272 Thus, Germany’s admission of some preferred stock was 
contrary to the Accord, but other regulators could not compel Germany to comply, 
and by that time their own domestic politics also favored relaxation of Basel.273 
Even when peer regulators care about compliance, however, it is nearly 
impossible to monitor and enforce with the tools available in the current IFR 
system. A country may remain in formal compliance—that is, its laws and 
regulations might follow international standards—while allowing widespread 
substantive noncompliance by its firms. This problem is aggravated by the fact that, 
to be effective, financial regulation requires constant and vigilant supervision and 
enforcement.274 A national regulator under political pressure to relax regulation 
does not have to change the rules; it can quietly instruct examiners to be less 
zealous, reduce supervision and enforcement resources, or commit “sins of 
omission” by failing to exercise authority it possesses.275 This relaxation can also 
happen incrementally through highly technical agency interpretations. Thus, in the 
1990s and 2000s, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Federal 
Reserve gradually allowed U.S. banks to expand their subprime mortgage and over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives activities through numerous, obscure regulatory 
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rulings.276 The cumulative implications of these small steps are hard to detect and 
understand even for domestic regulators, let alone for foreign observers. 
The second form of relaxation is that, over time, the TRNs themselves may 
simply modify the standards to reduce the burden on financial firms. This may even 
happen without any formal amendment of the standards if regulators, anticipating 
that domestic politics will shift over time, built flexibility into the initial agreement. 
For instance, Basel I gave national regulators substantial discretion to adjust their 
definition of regulatory capital, so many of the relaxations demanded by banks 
could be granted without breaching the Accord.277 Eventually, this flexibility was 
insufficient and regulators embarked upon a major reform effort. Basel II, in the 
end, substantially expanded national discretion. It is far more complex than Basel I, 
and contains numerous areas where regulators may choose among various options. 
It also gives them enormous discretion in assessing the adequacy of their banks’ 
internal risk measurement systems. Unsurprisingly, Basel II was strongly supported 
by the largest international banks, in the expectation that it would allow them to 
reduce their capital levels.278 In sum, even in the exceptional cases where 
international prudential standards are adopted, they are vulnerable to changes in 
domestic politics, various forms of noncompliance, and modification by national 
regulators. 
5. Making Credible Commitments to Overcome Time Inconsistency Problems 
Finally, a fifth problem of unilateralism is that uncoordinated, self-interested 
actions by individual states can lead to inefficient outcomes. To avoid such 
situations, states may agree in advance to ensure they will cooperate to achieve a 
more efficient outcome. However, one obstacle to such agreements is the time 
inconsistency problem. It arises when an actor wishes to commit to a certain course 
of action, but the actor’s preferences have shifted when the time comes to 
implement it. This shift, if anticipated by others, makes it impossible for the actor 
to credibly commit ex ante, and therefore precludes cooperation. A classic example 
relates to monetary policy. In the long term, a government may prefer to commit to 
a low-inflation policy; but when actual decisions on interest rates have to be made, 
it is likely to be swayed by short-term political considerations. Market participants, 
in turn, know that the government’s promise is not credible; they will anticipate 
higher inflation and make decisions accordingly, therefore negating the benefits of 
the low-inflation policy. This problem can sometimes be solved by creating 
mechanisms that allow actors to credibly bind themselves.279 Thus, many countries 
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have established independent central banks with a mandate to maintain price 
stability. 
Time inconsistency problems also arise in IFR. One manifestation, as seen 
above, relates to compliance with international prudential standards. Since there is 
no reliable mechanism to enforce the standards, they are vulnerable to opportunistic 
defection. Another manifestation of the time inconsistency problem is that some 
desirable standards may never be adopted because regulators cannot credibly 
commit to following them in the future. This may be the case for cross-border bank 
insolvency. Fundamentally, the coordination of bank insolvencies can follow either 
universality or territoriality. Under a universal system, a single jurisdiction—say, 
that of the bank’s home office—conducts consolidated proceedings. Other 
jurisdictions defer to the home state’s decisions and turn over the bank’s assets in 
their territory. The home state authority marshals the assets and distributes them to 
the bank’s creditors worldwide. Under a territorial system, each jurisdiction where 
the bank has operations or assets conducts separate proceedings. Its authorities 
gather the local assets of the bank and use them to pay local creditors.280 They may 
then turn over any surplus to other jurisdictions. As a result, despite the fact that the 
bank is a single legal entity, creditors in different countries will recover more or 
less, depending on where its assets and liabilities were at the time of insolvency. 
Most commentators argue that, ex ante, it would be more efficient for all states 
involved to agree to a universal system, along with arrangements to share the 
public costs of resolution among the relevant jurisdictions.281 Nevertheless, most 
states apply a territorial approach,282 and very little progress has been made on 
proposals to create a universal system.283 As the Governor of the Bank of England 
famously stated, “global banks are global in life but national in death.”284 Why? 
Here too, is a time inconsistency problem. Even if a universal system were in place, 
some states would have strong incentives to defect ex post, when a bank actually 
fails. This is because at the time of failure, some states will be revealed to hold 
more assets relative to local liabilities than others. If they turn over these assets to 
the universal proceeding, local creditors will recover less. At this point, there will 
be enormous political pressure from local creditors, often including the government 
itself, to refuse to comply with the universal system. As three U.S. banking officials 
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wrote, “when times are rough, [supervisors] will think like administrative officials, 
rather than judges. They will grab whatever they can.”285 These incentives make 
agreement on a universal resolution system virtually impossible ex ante because 
regulators will not believe each other’s promise to turn assets over to foreign 
proceedings or abide by burden-sharing agreements. 
As a result, the territorial system, though inefficient, has not been surmounted 
by non-binding international standards. Instead, territoriality has become more 
entrenched. The United States applies a “ring-fencing” approach to U.S. branches 
of foreign banks, under which not only the assets of the branch, but even assets in 
the United States owned by the home office, are allocated first to the U.S. branch’s 
creditors.286 The European Union, for its part, has adopted a universal system for 
banks headquartered in one member state with branches in others, but it does not 
apply to non-EU banks.287 Moreover, host states often require foreign banks to 
establish pledge accounts or maintain minimum assets in their jurisdiction, impose 
restrictions on transactions with foreign branches or affiliates, and decline to 
recognize claims arising from such transactions.288 These requirements are meant to 
ensure that there will be local assets to compensate local creditors. 
These rules create inefficiency in global banking: by making recovery 
dependent on where the transaction was “booked,” where assets are located at the 
time of insolvency, and what the priority rules are in each jurisdiction, they 
increase the cost of credit for banks. The United States also prohibits branches of 
foreign banks from taking retail deposits, requiring separately capitalized U.S. 
subsidiaries for this purpose.289 This type of local capitalization requirement 
impairs efficient cross-border capital allocation by international banks through 
branching.290 Beyond these economic costs, the absence of agreement on cross-
border resolution also undermines coordinated cross-border supervision by 
dissociating supervisory responsibility from financial responsibility. As a bank 
approaches insolvency, the problems worsen. Host supervisors may require banks 
to move additional capital to their jurisdiction, leading to conflict with the home 
state.291 They may also trigger insolvency proceedings too quickly, fearing that 
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assets will leave their jurisdiction.292 Once the bank is insolvent, rival resolution 
proceedings may compete with each other to access assets in third countries, 
increasing transaction costs and reducing total recovery.293 
Attempts to agree on other aspects of burden-sharing for financial firms have 
also failed. Early in the history of the Basel Committee, some participants argued 
that the Concordat should explicitly allocate the responsibility to act as lender of 
last resort for international banks.294 The Committee could not agree, leaving 
“calculated vagueness surrounding official arrangements to deal with an 
international banking crisis.”295 Likewise, international standards never addressed 
the allocation of responsibility between the home and host state for insuring 
deposits held in foreign branches, leaving the outcome to be decided by national 
authorities. Sometimes they protect foreign deposits, sometimes not. Often, the 
decision is made on a case-by-case basis and is influenced by political 
considerations. Thus, Iceland initially declined to indemnify foreign depositors 
when its banks collapsed.296 Host countries, for their part, act unilaterally by 
requiring foreign bank branches to join their own insurance regimes or set up 
separate subsidiaries to take retail deposits.297 In sum, because regulators cannot 
credibly commit themselves to comply with ex ante arrangements under the current 
informal IFR system, they instead take less efficient and potentially 
counterproductive unilateral actions. 
If states could achieve joint gains through credible ex ante commitments, why 
do they not create stronger mechanisms to enforce such commitments? Once again, 
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political factors suggest an explanation. First, national regulators currently have 
extensive and largely discretionary authority to resolve failed banks, which they 
may be reluctant to relinquish under a binding universal resolution scheme. Also, 
since the regime would likely be treaty based, it would involve complex 
negotiations and direct involvement by the executive and legislature, and regulators 
would lack control over the outcome. Second, the interests of large international 
banks are somewhat ambiguous, making them unlikely to provide strong support 
for such an initiative. On the one hand, they might benefit from efficiency gains if 
they could freely allocate their worldwide capital through branching, and greater 
certainty for creditors might reduce their cost of funds. On the other hand, without 
an explicit international allocation of responsibility for bank failures, large financial 
firms may benefit from a market perception that they are more likely to be provided 
assistance because of their systemic importance.298 Finally, while a universal 
system would likely produce benefits for all, the great powers might benefit 
relatively less than others. This is because they are better equipped to make the best 
of the unilateral “race for assets”: given the importance of their financial markets 
and infrastructure, international banks are more likely to have assets on their 
territory. These governments also have more economic and political leverage to 
force banks to maintain assets locally by forming separate subsidiaries, pledging 
accounts, and observing minimum asset requirements. 
C. Why Soft Law and TRNs? 
In sum, the current system based on TRNs and soft law is relatively successful 
at enforcement cooperation and liberalization. However, it has struggled to secure 
cooperation from countries with powerful anti-reform constituencies, as well as to 
consistently improve prudential standards. It has also largely ignored areas where 
cooperation would require credible commitment mechanisms.299 Given these 
limitations, it is conceivable that alternative arrangements—such as treaties, formal 
organizations, or dispute resolution—would produce more effective cooperation. 
Indeed, such arrangements are the rule in many other areas, including international 
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Table 1: Outcomes of International Financial Regulation 
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Specific Countries 
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Adopting Stricter 
Prudential Standards 
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(varies) 





~ ~ ~ – – 
Key: ++ = strongly positive; + = positive; ~ = neutral/indifferent; – = negative; -- = 
strongly negative. 
 
The conventional answer draws on rationalist theories of international law, 
according to which states choose soft law and informal institutions for reasons of 
speed, flexibility, and expertise. As seen above, however, the history of IFR 
indicates that soft law and TRNs first emerged in response to the absence of a 
formal institutional framework to address new cross-border regulatory challenges 
after Bretton Woods collapsed. In turn, this suggests that their persistence may be a 
product of historical path dependence. The current IFR system empowers certain 
categories of political actors—regulators, large firms, and great powers—which in 
turn have an interest in sustaining that system, even though it may be inefficient at 
achieving some desirable international regulatory objectives. 
In this respect, specialized regulators are inherently conflicted. While they want 
regulation to be sufficiently effective to avoid legislative intervention, they also 
prefer to act unilaterally whenever possible and, when cooperation is necessary, to 
preserve as much discretion and flexibility as possible. From their perspective, 
TRNs and soft law are appealing. They provide some degree of cross-border 
supervision and enforcement coordination while preserving their discretion to 
withhold cooperation in politically sensitive cases. They provide a substantial 
degree of liberalization, thus promoting financial development and securing 
important support from large firms. They can also produce some coordinated 
strengthening of prudential regulation in response to major crises, while preserving 
the flexibility to adjust stringency as domestic political winds shift back towards 
competitiveness. Therefore, from the regulators’ private perspective, soft law and 
TRNs reconcile their wish to achieve short-term regulatory objectives with their 
desire to preserve their domestic authority and flexibility. 
By contrast, more binding mechanisms would encroach considerably upon that 
authority and flexibility. First, national regulators typically lack the legal authority 
to commit their state to costly future courses of action, such as deferring to 
universal bank resolution proceedings. Therefore, such commitments would often 
require a change in law, inviting legislative intervention in their traditional 
responsibilities and removing the discretion they currently have in dealing with 
such situations. Second, creating institutions or treaties would also involve the 
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executive branch in their turf. For instance, U.S. agencies cannot enter into binding 
international commitments without approval by the State Department.301 Third, 
once adopted, more robust international standards and institutions would take away 
some of their authority and discretion. They might no longer be able to navigate 
competing domestic political pressures, for instance pressures from industry to 
relax regulatory stringency as financial crises recede in time. Stronger monitoring 
and enforcement of international standards would also involve international experts 
reviewing and second-guessing their actions, creating the potential for 
embarrassment (and perhaps sanctions). 
In any event, the areas in which TRNs and soft law are unsuccessful are of less 
immediate concern to regulators. Specialized regulators in major jurisdictions are 
not held responsible for the costs caused by poor regulation in LDCs and OFCs. 
While some of these costs are externalized, they are borne by the IFIs, 
governments, and taxpayers in the contributing countries, not by financial 
regulators. Likewise, the lack of effective monitoring and enforcement of 
prudential standards may over time force them to loosen their own regulation, but 
they may well prefer this outcome to more rigid standards that would expose them 
to political pressure in good economic times. Likewise, the lack of an international 
regime for bank resolution is inefficient, but this problem is chronic rather than 
acute. When these inefficiencies are pointed out, regulators can argue that only a 
treaty could secure better outcomes, while stressing the political and technical 
obstacles. In other words, since specialized regulators are not directly accountable 
for failures in areas where IFR performs poorly, and they prefer to preserve as 
much authority and discretion as possible, they have little incentive to strive for a 
more formal and binding IFR system. 
Large financial firms, for their part, are likely to be satisfied with the current 
system because it is successful at achieving the objectives they favor—such as 
liberalization—and unsuccessful at those they disfavor—such as strengthening 
prudential regulation. While they might gain from deeper harmonization under a 
more robust IFR system, this benefit would likely be outweighed by the costs of 
stricter prudential regulation. Likewise, a universal resolution mechanism would 
allow them to better allocate their capital, but it would also compromise the 
competitive benefits they derive from the implicit safety net.302 Moreover, their 
influence is self-reinforcing: as financial liberalization progresses, large firms gain 
market share and political influence from smaller, domestically oriented firms that 
oppose liberalization. Therefore, they prefer to advocate liberalization initiatives 
within the current system, rather than more formal treaties and institutions that 
might expose them to stricter regulation. 
Finally, since the great powers are in a better position to act unilaterally than 
other countries, they benefit relatively less from cooperation. Their markets are 
larger and inherently attractive, giving them greater flexibility to adjust their 
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regulation according to domestic needs. Because of the size of their markets and the 
prestige of their regulators, their standards are more likely to spread to other 
countries through market pressures and ideological diffusion without requiring 
formal cooperation. When necessary to control externalities, they can often act 
unilaterally or through clubs, rather than resorting to broad-based cooperation. For 
instance, the United States pursued a protracted unilateral campaign against Swiss 
banks to reduce tax avoidance, and eventually secured substantial cooperation.303 
Great powers also have less need for a universal system of bank resolution, because 
banks are more likely to have assets in their jurisdiction. Where cooperation is 
needed, great powers prefer to avoid formal, independent IOs.304 Rather, they steer 
standard-setting to less formal bodies like TRNs and then deputize formal IOs or 
clubs to monitor and enforce the standards as needed.305 
Thus, all three of the most influential political actors—regulators, firms, and 
great powers—have reasons to prefer the current system. This suggests that it may 
persist despite its inefficiency. At this point, however, an important clarification is 
needed. This Article does not claim that all the unsolved problems of IFR could be 
solved with certainty by treaties or formal international organizations. It may be 
that some problems are simply intractable. For example, agreeing on an ex ante 
burden-sharing formula for banks, or creating rules to designate the home 
jurisdiction for insolvency proceedings, would undoubtedly be difficult. The 
benefits of facilitating cross-border branching may also be limited given the 
availability of alternative channels for capital flows.306 The great powers may do so 
well out of territoriality that they would not agree to universality under any 
circumstances. In that case, the problem would be a true deadlock that no 
institutional solution could solve.307 The claim, then, is not that hard law or 
institutions would be desirable in all cases, but that there are strong historical and 
political factors that favor soft law and TRNs and hinder the emergence of other 
arrangements. As a result, undersupply of welfare-enhancing cooperation in IFR is 
more likely than oversupply. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION AFTER THE CRISIS 
A. How Did the Crisis Affect IFR? 
The global financial crisis has had two major implications for IFR. First, 
prudential regulation, systemic risk, and moral hazard concerns have taken center 
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stage. The failure of several major institutions and the struggle by governments to 
manage the consequences drew attention to critical weaknesses in financial 
markets. These included high leverage, widespread liquidity vulnerabilities, lack of 
transparency of positions, inadequate risk analysis, and interconnected exposures 
among market participants.308 The sum of these weaknesses is “systemic risk,” the 
risk that the failure of one or more financial institutions can cause a cascading 
failure that leads to the collapse of the financial system.309 Financial institutions can 
be systemically significant for several reasons: some are so large that their failure 
affects many other market participants, others are extensively interconnected with 
others through financial contracts, and clusters of institutions with highly correlated 
exposures can be systemically significant in aggregate. Because the failure of such 
institutions could cause extensive economic damage, governments come under 
pressure to rescue them. Since these institutions know this, they have ex ante 
incentives to take excessive risks, a phenomenon known as moral hazard. Other 
market participants also expect that these institutions will not be allowed to fail and 
deal with them on favorable terms, exacerbating their systemic importance.310 
As a result, controlling systemic risk and moral hazard has become the central 
concern of post-crisis financial reform.311 Numerous approaches have been 
proposed: identifying systemically significant financial institutions (SSFIs) and 
subjecting them to enhanced prudential regulation and supervision; limiting their 
size or activities; establishing a credible resolution procedure for SSFIs; prohibiting 
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government bailouts to SSFIs; and regulating financial contracts that may create 
systemic risk, such as OTC derivatives. Other post-crisis measures aim at 
improving prudential regulation more generally, such as raising bank capital 
requirements and expanding the regulatory net to the shadow banking system.312 
Each of these approaches is complex, and their relative effectiveness is debated. 
However, they share one fundamental objective: to force systemic institutions and 
market participants to internalize costs that would otherwise be borne by 
governments and taxpayers. In other words, they are precisely the type of stricter 
prudential regulation that IFR has historically failed to deliver consistently. 
Second, the crisis has led to a major effort to update the architecture of IFR and 
develop new substantive international standards. The G-20, which had been created 
after the Asian financial crisis but played a marginal role, supplanted the G-7 as the 
principal forum for international economic cooperation.313 It has taken a more 
direct role in setting priorities for regulatory reform and coordinating the work of 
TRNs, IFIs, and other actors.314 It reorganized the Financial Stability Forum as the 
Financial Stability Board, with a broader mandate and membership, including all 
G-20 members.315 The FSB’s mission is to coordinate and oversee the work of 
other standard-setting bodies, and in some cases to develop  new standards itself in 
areas that cut across the mandate of individual TRNs.316 The Basel Committee and 
IOSCO’s Technical Committee also expanded their membership.317 The G-20 has 
adopted a detailed action plan for reforming IFR, including initiatives on capital 
adequacy, cross-border resolution, regulation of rating agencies, hedge funds and 
OTC derivatives, global accounting standards, executive compensation, and many 
others.318 One feature of many of these initiatives is the decline in reliance on 
private standards and self-regulation in favor of mandatory rules.319 The actual 
standard-setting work, however, typically remains in the hands of national 
regulators and TRNs.320 
Thus, the post-crisis reforms do not fundamentally replace TRNs and soft law, 
but rather attempt to expand, rationalize, and strengthen the existing system in 
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various ways.321 Nevertheless, the assumption by the G-20 of authority over IFR is 
an important structural development. The G-20 is not a TRN; it is a political body 
made up of the national leaders (or ministers) of the member states. However, it is 
not a formal international organization either.322 Like TRNs, the G-20 does not 
have international legal personality, its decisions are made by consensus, and they 
are not legally binding.323 In theory, it has no formal authority to set goals for IFIs 
and TRNs. In practice, however, the G-20 members collectively control a large 
majority of votes in the IFIs,324 their financial regulators dominate the principal 
TRNs, and they comprise about 85% of the world’s GDP.325 Thus, the G-20 has the 
capacity to exercise enormous influence on IFR and potentially overcome the 
constraints that have hindered progress in the past. It could play a leadership role, 
compelling TRNs to undertake reforms that they would not initiate on their own 
because of resistance by national regulators or the financial industry.326 With its 
broader membership, it could also balance the influence of the great powers. It 
could facilitate trade-offs across issues, overcoming distributive roadblocks that 
specialized TRNs cannot handle, and better handle issues that cut across the 
functional jurisdiction of individual TRNs, like OTC derivatives and shadow 
banking. The new system could also provide more effective monitoring and 
enforcement. 
The potential effect of this new international architecture may be reinforced by 
the strong domestic political demand that has emerged for stronger prudential 
regulation after the financial crisis. In major financial centers like the United States, 
United Kingdom, and several Continental European countries, costly and well-
publicized bailouts of financial institutions raised fierce political opposition and 
demands for reform. The salience of regulatory failures has been raised by multiple 
inquiries and reports criticizing the actions of regulators and the financial 
industry.327 In some cases, countries did not wait for an international consensus to 
emerge before launching major domestic regulatory overhauls. Thus, the Dodd-
Frank Act was adopted in July 2010, and the massive program of rule making it 
initiated remains in full swing. The European Union has also already completed 
some initiatives, although its reform program has progressed more slowly due to 
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greater deference to the international process and competing preoccupations 
relating to Europe’s sovereign debt crisis. 
B. Post-Crisis Achievements 
This section proposes a brief review of three salient items on the post-crisis 
agenda: enhanced capital regulation through Basel III, cross-border resolution of 
financial institutions, and stronger monitoring and enforcement of international 
standards.328 It shows that despite the expectations raised by the combination of 
strong political demand for reform and a more streamlined international 
architecture, many of the pre-crisis patterns described earlier in this Article persist. 
1. Basel III 
The G-20 made reforming capital adequacy standards a very high priority. 
Numerous banks failed, or would have failed, without official assistance, and many 
policymakers and commentators pointed to weaknesses in Basel II.329 The Basel 
Committee assumed responsibility over reform and made rapid progress. In 
December 2010, it released the principal elements of Basel III.330 The new 
framework aims to correct many of the problems of Basel II. It substantially 
increases required capital ratios and adopts more stringent and uniform definitions 
of regulatory capital. It also introduces several new elements that respond to risks 
highlighted by the crisis. Under Basel III, banks will have to maintain, in addition 
to the basic capital ratio, a capital conservation buffer to be drawn down in times of 
stress.331 
Basel III also introduces capital surcharges for “too big to fail” institutions, as 
well as a countercyclical buffer under which regulators will have flexibility to 
increase capital requirements to control excessive credit growth in favorable 
economic conditions.332 These stronger risk-weighted capital requirements will be 
supplemented by a simpler and more transparent leverage ratio of 3% capital to 
total assets.333 Finally, Basel III will impose new liquidity requirements: the 
liquidity coverage ratio, which will require banks to hold enough highly liquid 
assets to survive a thirty-day freeze in funding, and the net stable funding ratio, 
which will require banks to maintain a minimum amount of stable sources of 
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funding such as long-term debt and deposits.334 These ratios are meant to reduce 
banks’ excessive reliance on short-term funding, which led to the downfall of 
institutions like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers when they unexpectedly lost 
access to such funding. 
On its face, Basel III is a remarkable strengthening of capital requirements. The 
Basel Committee estimated that, had the new rules been in place at the end of 2009, 
large banks would have had to hold €577 billion of additional capital.335 Since the 
adoption of Basel III, banks have begun to rebuild their capital bases, and the gap 
between the new requirements and actual capital levels has reportedly fallen by 
23% between 2011 and 2012.336 Basel III’s stricter definition of regulatory capital 
will also strengthen the resilience of banks by preventing them from counting 
various dubious items like deferred tax assets, in favor of more common equity. 
Overall, policymakers have openly stated that their objective is to change the 
business model of banks towards a more stable, less leveraged, and less profitable 
one, attracting fierce industry resistance.337 
In other ways, however, Basel III perpetuates pre-crisis patterns. First and most 
importantly, it does not replace Basel II’s controversial risk-weighting 
methodology, but instead simply increases the percentage of capital to be held 
relative to the risk-weighted assets calculated according to Basel II.338 Thus, large 
banks will continue to internally generate the parameters used to calculate their 
own capital requirements. In recent years, this methodology has become 
increasingly controversial. Several analysts have pointed to large discrepancies in 
risk estimates produced by different banks based on similar asset portfolios.339 
Likewise, senior regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have expressed severe 
doubts that the Basel II risk-weighting methodology can produce accurate and 
consistent measurements and have called for simpler regulatory solutions like a 
high leverage ratio or limits on bank size.340 While it seems unlikely that the Basel 
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Committee will abandon its current methodology, the lack of comparability is 
raising concerns that banks that apply it more leniently may gain a competitive 
advantage. 
Second, Basel III might aggravate this comparability problem, because in 
addition to retaining considerable discretion for national regulators in approving 
and supervising internal risk models, it also introduces new areas of discretion. 
Thus, although there are common guidelines for implementing the countercyclical 
capital buffer, national authorities ultimately will decide how much additional 
capital to require based on their own judgment of the sustainable level of credit in 
their economy.341 It is not hard to imagine that in good times, there will be political 
pressure to refrain from “taking away the punch bowl” by increasing the buffer. 
Likewise, the capital conservation buffer gives national regulators critical 
discretion as to how long to allow banks to operate within the buffer range.342 
Although the Committee exhorts regulators to apply them transparently and 
consistently, the liquidity ratios also admittedly “contain elements of national 
discretion to reflect jurisdiction-specific conditions.”343 Some degree of national 
discretion may be inevitable for complex international standards, but the fact 
remains that both complexity and discretion may further undermine comparability 
and make the standards vulnerable to domestic politics. 
Third, the Basel III negotiations reflected the usual campaigning by countries to 
accommodate the preferences of their banks. France and Germany fought for lower 
capital increases and for inclusion of consolidated minority interests in foreign 
banks.344 Despite the resistance of European banks, the leverage ratio was retained, 
but at 3% it is significantly lower than the 5% requirement for major U.S. banks—
leading to concerns that it will not compensate adequately for the defects of the 
risk-weighting methodology. Japanese banks tried to retain their ability to count 
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deferred tax assets as regulatory capital, although they only gained a temporary 
reprieve. More controversial aspects of Basel III, like the systemic risk surcharge 
and liquidity requirements, were not finalized when the accord was released in 
2010. The details remain to be filled in and many areas are highly controversial. 
Finally, since Basel III must be implemented domestically in each jurisdiction, 
its adoption is only the beginning of a long and contentious process. It 
contemplates a long transition period, with full implementation in 2019. Already, 
the implementation process has become highly politicized. In the United States, 
regulators face strong opposition by banks. Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan 
Chase, strongly criticized the systemic risk surcharge and other aspects of Basel III, 
calling it “blatantly anti-American.”345 More recently, numerous U.S. banks—large 
and small—have raised objections to the proposed rules and requested that 
implementation be delayed.346 In November 2012, U.S. banking regulators 
announced that the final rules would indeed be delayed indefinitely, missing the 
global deadline of January 1, 2013.347 In Europe, implementation of Basel III led to 
a political rift between the United Kingdom, which suffered high bailout costs and 
wanted faster and stricter implementation, and France and Germany, whose banks 
and economies are heavily affected by the ongoing European debt crisis.348 In the 
summer of 2012, the United Kingdom acceded to many French and German 
demands.349 The Basel Committee has criticized the resulting compromise, 
deeming it “noncompliant” with Basel III in two important areas including its 
looser capital definitions.350 Its implementation appears likely to be delayed beyond 
the international deadlines.351 
In sum, Basel III perpetuates a familiar pattern for international prudential 
standards: regulators, under intense domestic political pressure, agree to strengthen 
existing rules. At the same time, they secure concessions to favor their banks and 
rely on complex rules whose effectiveness depends on national supervision. Thus, 
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they retain considerable discretion, including the capacity to relax implementation 
in response to political pressure.352 Indeed, soon after the crisis, the industry began 
to reassert its influence and demand modifications to the most demanding aspects 
of the new rules—as did politicians who worried about the impact of stricter capital 
requirements on economic recovery. In turn, such modifications may increase 
competitive pressures on other regulators to relax their own implementation. Basel 
III also illustrates the role of path dependence for specific international standards: 
despite widespread criticism and well-recognized problems, the Basel II risk-
weighting approach is deeply entrenched, and most regulators appear to see no 
feasible alternative but to build upon it. 
2. Cross-Border Bank Resolution 
At the London Summit, the G-20 directed the FSB, IMF, World Bank, and the 
Basel Committee to develop an international framework for cross-border bank 
resolution.353 So far, the results fall well short of this objective. Even before the 
crisis, experts believed that only a treaty could truly secure cooperation in this 
area.354 In a recent report, the Basel Committee echoes this view, stating that an 
enforceable agreement on burden-sharing “would be an essential element, along 
with other important changes in national legal frameworks, for the creation of a 
comprehensive framework for the resolution of cross-border financial groups.”355 
Concluding that such an agreement is unfeasible in current circumstances, the 
BCBS and the IMF have effectively abandoned the initial goal of developing a 
comprehensive framework. Instead, they have adopted a less ambitious “middle 
ground” approach that recognizes that states will act unilaterally in a crisis, and 
tries to make such improvements as can be achieved without binding 
commitments.356 
In practice, this means encouraging states to improve aspects of their domestic 
resolution procedures that may hinder cross-border resolution even where they 
wish to cooperate, for instance, by removing legal restrictions on voluntary 
cooperation, improving advanced planning for resolution of complex institutions, 
and facilitating continuity of services and contractual relationships. These standards 
would require assistance “only to the extent that the authorities determine that such 
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co-ordination is consistent with their own national interests.”357 The Basel 
Committee candidly concluded in July 2011 that “[t]here has been no progress 
towards the development of a framework for cross-border enforcement of 
resolution actions[.]”358 Even within the new, more limited objectives, results so far 
are modest.359 More ambitious projects, such as ex ante burden-sharing agreements 
for specific institutions, remain on the table but their prospects are unclear.360 
Once again, familiar patterns persist. The IFR system struggles to address the 
commitment problem involved in developing arrangements for resolution and 
burden sharing for cross-border financial firms. Interestingly, some of the largest 
financial firms appear to have concluded that the benefits of a stronger resolution 
regime would outweigh its costs. Thus, several large banks and industry groups 
have called for binding international rules on cross-border resolution.361 Despite 
this, while the need for greater cooperation is widely accepted, progress appears 
stalled by the lack of interest on the part of national regulators and great powers in 
relinquishing their discretion to address failures on an ad hoc basis. 
3. Monitoring and Enforcement 
The G-20 has also initiated efforts to strengthen monitoring and enforcement of 
international standards. As seen above, the FSAP program historically targeted 
developing countries, but the gravest pre-crisis regulatory failures occurred in 
advanced economies. At the Washington Summit, all G-20 members committed to 
undertake FSAP reviews. Since then, the IMF has launched a process to identify all 
systemically important national financial systems and conduct mandatory FSAPs 
every five years, and FSB members have committed themselves to “peer reviews” 
of their adherence to FSAP recommendations.362 These country peer reviews will 
focus on implementation and effectiveness of regulatory, supervisory, and other 
financial sector policies; the reports will be published; and the FSB will follow up 
on recommendations.363 The FSB will also conduct thematic peer reviews of the 
implementation of specific standards across countries, although individual TRNs 
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like the Basel Committee and IOSCO will have primary responsibility for peer 
review of standards they designed.364 
This new process is still in its infancy, and how much it will achieve remains 
unclear. On the one hand, it promises more frequent evaluations by peers with 
direct regulatory expertise, which may alleviate the shortcomings of existing IFI 
oversight. It also puts pressure on existing TRNs to improve their monitoring, since 
the FSB expects them to have “robust peer review mechanism[s] in place that [are] 
comparable to th[ose] of the FSB.”365 On the other hand, the peer review system 
has substantial limitations. The country reviews’ principal goal is to assess progress 
in addressing recommendations in FSAP and ROSC reports, not to independently 
evaluate the country’s compliance with international standards.366 A country that is 
found “compliant” or “largely compliant” by the IMF will not require further 
evaluation. In securities regulation, signature of the IOSCO MMOU will be 
considered sufficient.367 Based on the FSB’s Handbook, both country and thematic 
peer reviews will rely primarily on questionnaires filled out by the country’s own 
regulators, and are not expected to include on-site visits.368 Given this procedure, it 
seems likely that—like prior efforts—peer reviews will be more effective at 
assessing formal than substantive compliance. Their effectiveness will depend 
crucially on the willingness of regulators to forcefully question and challenge their 
peers. As seen above, however, regulators have historically been reluctant to breach 
a deep-seated norm of mutual deference. 
The G-20 and the FSB have also announced a new “toolbox of measures” to 
encourage adherence to international standards by nonmembers.369 Under this 
process, the FSB will identify problem jurisdictions based on their financial 
importance and compliance assessments. These jurisdictions, whose identities will 
not be disclosed, “will be invited to engage in a confidential dialogue with the FSB 
in order to further evaluate their adherence and identify ways to improve 
adherence.”370 Ultimately, if the FSB identifies uncorrected weaknesses, it may 
recommend coercive measures such as placing the jurisdiction on a list of 
noncooperative countries and imposing greater due diligence obligations or outright 
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restrictions on cross-border transactions.371 While this initiative appears innovative, 
in many respects it repeats prior efforts to target OFCs with sanctions to secure 
greater cooperation with onshore tax authorities.372 Thus, it focuses on cooperation 
and information exchange rather than on substantive regulation, and prioritizes 
formal compliance by relying on IFI assessments and formal signature of the 
MMOU.373 The array of potential sanctions is impressive—in theory, they could 
reach so far as to effectively exclude the offending country from the international 
financial system. It is unclear, however, how the FSB proposes to solve the 
collective action problems endemic in international sanctions374 or the tensions 
between this coercive program and the consensus-based TRN process.375 The 
“toolbox of measures” is not intended to give teeth to international financial 
standards generally; it is merely a new installment in the campaign against OFCs. 
In sum, the introduction of mandatory FSAP and peer reviews, while positive, 
will be relatively infrequent and appear to focus on formal rather than substantive 
compliance. These mechanisms also rely on the ability and willingness of national 
regulators to evaluate and criticize their colleagues’ compliance efforts, which they 
historically have been reluctant to do. The most aggressive new compliance 
initiative is aimed at OFCs, whose role was not central to the crisis, rather than at 
the developed jurisdictions where the most salient regulatory failures originated. 
Thus, despite these efforts, the IFR system may continue to encounter serious 
difficulties in ensuring effective and consistent implementation of standards. 
C. Where to from Here? 
In light of these limitations, the achievements of post-crisis IFR should not be 
exaggerated.376 In many ways, they repeat familiar patterns: prudential standards 
are enhanced in response to political pressure while preserving the authority and 
discretion of national regulators; some issues, like bank resolution, remain largely 
off limits; the financial industry can effectively oppose costly prudential standards 
both at the formation and implementation stages; and monitoring and enforcement 
of standards remains weak, in part because of the deep-seated reluctance of 
regulators to be seen as interfering in each others’ jurisdiction. In some cases, 
domestic reform initiatives driven by intense political pressure have simply 
outpaced international efforts. Thus, legislatures have taken a central role, eclipsing 
to some extent the traditional primacy of specialized regulators and forcing the G-
20 and TRNs to play catch up. For example, after the Dodd-Frank Act, a clearing 
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requirement for OTC derivatives was hastily added to the G-20/FSB program.377 
The United States has moved ahead with the Volcker Rule, which has not been 
adopted by other countries. U.S. and European approaches differ in several areas, 
including hedge fund regulation, CRAs, and derivatives.378 Some initiatives, like 
the global bank tax, simply fizzled out because of disagreement in the G-20. 
In response to the shortcomings of IFR, prominent commentators have proposed 
the creation of a formal international organization, backed by binding legal 
obligations, to regulate international finance.379 The conventional answer is that 
such proposals are politically infeasible because states are unwilling to delegate 
financial regulation to an international organization due to sovereignty concerns.380 
On its own, this explanation seems insufficient. After all, states have created 
binding international treaties and institutions in several areas with profound 
domestic policy implications, including climate change, nuclear energy, and trade. 
This article suggests instead that radical reform of IFR is highly unlikely because 
historical path dependence and political economy create a high degree of inertia in 
the current system.381 Nevertheless, the mounting challenges of financial 
interdependence and the recurrence of serious regulatory failures will likely 
continue to increase demand for stronger international rules and oversight. For the 
foreseeable future, then, IFR may exist in an uneasy state of tension between 
pressures for reform and political and historical constraints on its evolution. Over 
time, the trend is likely to be towards more binding agreements and stronger 
monitoring, at least in areas—such as prudential regulation and cross-border 
resolution—where the limitations of TRNs and soft law are most evident. This 
progress in international cooperation, however, is likely to be gradual, slow, and 
punctuated by crises. 
In the near term, the analysis above suggests useful directions for reforms. First, 
the issue of substantive compliance with international standards must become much 
more central. One option is to further enhance the monitoring and enforcement 
capabilities of IFIs and TRNs, for instance, by letting international or peer country 
officials directly inspect large financial firms and conduct detailed independent 
audits of national supervision. A second, largely neglected option would be to 
consciously design international standards so as to facilitate effective monitoring 
and enforcement within the institutional constraints of IFR. From that standpoint, 
the best domestic rules may not make the best international standards.382 Thus, 
from a domestic perspective, Basel II’s turn towards sophisticated internal risk 
models may be a logical evolution of the Basel I risk-weighting framework. 
However, Basel II’s complexity and reliance on national supervisory skill 
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undermine the goal of international uniformity.383 A less sophisticated but more 
transparent approach would greatly facilitate monitoring and enforcement. 
Second, compliance with IFR will continue to depend on decentralized 
monitoring and pressures by IFIs, peer regulators, and market participants for the 
foreseeable future, despite the limitations of these mechanisms. To maximize their 
effectiveness, policymakers should design standards that are simple and transparent 
enough that such actors can assess substantive compliance—even if this comes at 
some cost in technical optimality of the rules.384 Concretely, this might involve 
greater use of regulatory approaches that reduce complexity and national discretion. 
For instance, the Basel Committee should consider simplifying the buffet of 
alternative and optional rules in the Basel II risk-weighting framework.385 Also, the 
role of market participants in monitoring financial firms could be enhanced by 
requiring banks to issue contingent convertible debt386 and by making bank 
disclosure more detailed and usable.387 In general, international standards may 
perform better if they incorporate structural solutions—such as limiting the size of 
banks or prohibiting specific activities—instead of regimes like Basel II that rely 
on national regulators to oversee complex risk management systems.388 Compliance 
with such solutions would be easier for IFIs, peer regulators and markets to assess. 
Third, policymakers should explore the possibility of complementing soft law 
with binding obligations in areas where enforcement and commitment problems are 
most pronounced. For instance, experts have long argued that a treaty would be the 
only way to create a functioning system of cross-border bank resolution. While 
regulators recognize this, they assert that the political will does not exist.389 It may 
be worth creating a template that would be available when the next cycle of crisis 
and reform happens. The solution might be a treaty that lays out an umbrella of 
legal obligations for states, such as to comply with ex ante agreements on 
resolution and loss sharing, under which regulators could negotiate detailed 
arrangements for specific firms. These arrangements could be adapted in response 
to changing circumstances, thus combining the “compliance pull” of formal 
obligations with the flexibility of current cooperation arrangements. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the current IFR system, based on TRNs and soft 
law, is only partly successful at achieving desirable international cooperation. It has 
generally failed to secure improvements in regulation in countries with powerful 
antireform constituencies, to produce consistent improvements in prudential 
standards, and to address areas like bank resolution where cooperation requires 
credible commitment mechanisms. It has also argued that this state of affairs is not 
a product of rational design by states, but the outcome of historical path 
dependence and the interests of the most powerful political actors in IFR: 
regulators, financial firms, and great powers. While some reforms have occurred, 
these patterns persist. As a result, there is reason to doubt that IFR can effectively 
address the most salient postcrisis challenges—moral hazard and systemic risk—at 
least in the short-term. Instead, increasing demand for international cooperation 
may lead to gradual strengthening of the IFR system, including a partial move 
away from exclusive reliance on TRNs and soft law. 
This argument has implications for broader debates about rational choice 
approaches to international law and financial globalization. In recent years, 
rationalist theories have made great strides in explaining how states can use 
international law and institutions to solve cooperation problems and achieve joint 
gains. However, such theories can also predispose scholars of specific areas such as 
IFR to assume they are optimally designed, overemphasize evidence to that effect, 
and neglect important problems of compliance and effectiveness. While rational 
choice theory is a major advance in international law scholarship, it is inherently 
probabilistic: other things being equal, states are likely to design institutions 
rationally. However, other things are rarely equal: international institutions may be 
inefficient for many reasons, including historical path dependence, principal-agent 
problems, interest group politics, and power inequalities. Thus, when analyzing 
specific institutions, scholars should carefully assess their effectiveness and the 
historical and political processes that shaped them. While this makes the analysis 
more challenging, it will allow more meaningful critique. 
The framework proposed here also reveals how much research remains to be 
done on IFR. In particular, systematic empirical research remains in its infancy, and 
opportunities abound for fruitful inquiry. How are standards negotiated? Through 
what channels does the political influence of various actors manifest itself? To 
what extent do the resulting standards require departure from existing national 
practices? Once standards are adopted, which countries adopt them, and why? 
What difficulties arise in implementation? How does the formal process of 
adopting uniform standards interact with the informal process of transnational 
policy diffusion? Does the adoption of a standard actually change practices on the 
ground? If so, under what conditions is compliance more or less likely? Even when 
they are complied with, are the standards effective at attaining their policy 
objectives? These questions can only be answered by research on the development, 
implementation, and effect of specific IFR initiatives. 
Finally, proponents of liberal international finance should not celebrate the 
current weakness of IFR. If the current system cannot effectively control the 
externalities of financial crises, create and sustain strong prudential standards, or 
handle the failure of large financial firms, the result may be an increasing burden 
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on governments and taxpayers. Ultimately, weak IFR may not necessarily lead to 
freer markets in the long run. The instability of the Great Depression ushered in the 
Bretton Woods system that strictly limited international finance. Not 
coincidentally, after the recent crisis, the IMF has warmed to capital controls.390 
Some commentators now advocate robust “host country” regulation, requiring 
banks to establish ring-fenced subsidiaries in each country.391 Over time, the 
alternative to effective cooperation may not be freer global markets, but increasing 
de jure or de facto restraints on capital mobility. 
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